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*

In many different cases, the Supreme Court and lower courts have
used a rigorous form of rational basis scrutiny very different from the
ordinary, deferential rational basis scrutiny taught in constitutional law
courses. When invoked, this more rigorous form of rational basis
scrutiny has proven fatal to statutes and regulations. Many scholars and
courts have described how courts apply it and have defended particular
cases in which it has been used. No one, however, has explained just why
and when courts will or ought to apply it. This gap is troublesome and
pressing. Rigorous rational basis scrutiny is an important part of the
constitutional toolkit, and courts have increasingly applied it to a wide
variety of circumstances—including same-sex marriage, adoption by gay
men and lesbians, and intimate sexual relations. This term, the Supreme
Court will be hearing argument on—and presumably deciding—two
same-sex marriage cases. Which level of scrutiny the Court applies to the
laws challenged in these lawsuits will likely determine whether same sex
marriage will be legal in California and whether the federal Defense of
Marriage Act’s definition of marriage is constitutional. The issue of
same-sex marriage is one of the most important civil rights issues today,
and these cases should be decided by principle, not by a judge’s personal

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School. Many thanks to Larry
Alexander, Carl Auerbach, Dale Carpenter, Guy Charles, Bill Eskridge, Dan Farber,
Kenneth Karst, David McGowan, and Naomi Mezey for helpful comments and criticism. I
feel deep gratitude toward my mentor and dear friend, the late Phil Frickey, who also
commented on this draft. This article springs from the questions raised by his work with Bill
Eskridge. Phil’s friendship and example inspired—and inspires—me. I dedicate this article to
him.
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preferences. This article traces the history of rigorous rational basis
scrutiny and shows that courts use it to protect groups from majority
overreaching but do not want to invoke intermediate or strict scrutiny.
That courts apply it to protect groups raises the question of what makes a
group a group, not merely a collection of people who share a common
interest or characteristic. This article explains the conditions necessary
and sufficient to distinguish groups. Drawing on behavioral economics
and psychology, it also explains why rigorous rational basis scrutiny is the
right tool for protecting such groups from majority overreaching. Indeed,
rigorous rational basis scrutiny may be a more effective tool than
intermediate or strict scrutiny for protecting group interests in the long
term. Unlike strict scrutiny, it does not effectively forbid majorities from
regulating groups. Instead, it gives group members a seat at the political
table, which forces majorities to take groups and their members into
account when making decisions and providing reasons for those
decisions.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny therefore reinforces
democratic political processes by ensuring that minority group members
are taken into account as members both of their group and of the polity,
without depriving majorities of the right to govern the polity as a whole.
I.
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INTRODUCTION

This term the Supreme Court will be hearing argument on two cases
that affect the constitutional rights of same-sex partners to marry. The
1
first is Hollingsworth v. Perry, the appeal from the Ninth Circuit
2
decision that declared California’s Proposition 8 unconstitutional.
Proposition 8 amended California’s constitution to limit marriage to
opposite-sex couples and overturned the California Supreme Court’s
earlier ruling that the California Constitution gave gay men and lesbians
3
4
the right to marry. The second is United States v. Windsor, the appeal
from the Second Circuit decision that declared unconstitutional the
federal Defense of Marriage Act’s (DOMA) definition of marriage as
5
those unions between opposite-sex couples. DOMA denies federal
benefits that accrue to marriage (such as social security survivors’
benefits) to same-sex couples who are legally married in their home
states. It precludes these couples from filing joint income tax returns,
and it denies federal employees dependent benefits for their same-sex
6
spouses.
The circuit courts in Hollingsworth and Windsor took different
routes to arrive at the conclusion that these restrictions on the rights of
same-sex partners were unconstitutional. Windsor held that gay men
and lesbians were a suspect group, and it used intermediate scrutiny to
7
determine that DOMA was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court,
8
however, has long avoided declaring new suspect classifications or new

1. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012).
2. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012).
3. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 66–68 (Cal. 2009) (describing the history of
Proposition 8 from its creation during the California Supreme Court’s proceedings in In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5, to its passage by ballot initiative on November 4, 2008).
4. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9413 (Dec. 7, 2012).
5. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, No. 12-307, 2012
U.S. LEXIS 9413; see Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
6. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2012).
7. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 176; see Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441–42 (1985) (holding that persons with disabilities were not a
suspect class because when “individuals . . . have distinguishing characteristics relevant to”
state interests courts are, and should be, “very reluctant . . . to closely scrutinize legislative
choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued”);
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9

fundamental rights. Most likely it will decline to do so in these cases.
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Hollingsworth provides a surer
roadmap for a Supreme Court decision that upholds the rights of gay
and lesbian couples. There, the Ninth Circuit used a rigorous form of
rational basis scrutiny to strike down California’s ban on same-sex
10
marriage. The First Circuit also used this rigorous form of rational
basis scrutiny in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health
and Human Services to declare unconstitutional DOMA’s restrictive
11
definition of marriage. (The Supreme Court has not granted certiorari
in this case.) Both the Ninth Circuit and First Circuit disclaimed that
12
they were recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.
Instead, both claimed to strike down discrete restrictions on same-sex
partners, nothing more.
This stringent form of rational basis scrutiny has a curious history.
Some lower courts have explicitly injected rigor into rational basis
analysis to strike down laws because the law restricted the liberties of
certain groups; such laws would have been upheld under more lenient
13
conceptions of rationality. The Supreme Court, however, has never
Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976) (“[E]qual protection
analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar
disadvantage of a suspect class,” and a mandatory retirement age of 50 “involves neither
situation.”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (declining to
hold that indigent persons were a suspect classification because such a class has “none of the
traditional indicia of suspectness”).
9. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (describing the right of same-sex
partners to engage in intimate sexual conduct as a “protected” liberty interest, not a
fundamental right); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (noting that the
Court has “always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and openended” and refusing to declare fundamental the right of terminally ill patients to end their
lives); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37 (finding that the arguments in favor of education being
deemed a “fundamental right” are “unpersuasive”).
10. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089 (“While deferential, the rational-basis standard ‘is not a
toothless one.’” (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976))).
11. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 1.
12. See id. at 8 (explaining that precedent does not “mandate[] that the Constitution
require[] states to permit same-sex marriages”); Perry, 671 F.3d at 1082 (“There is no
necessity in either case that the privilege, benefit, or protection at issue be a constitutional
right.”).
13. In addition to Perry, 671 F.3d 1052, and Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 1, this trend can also
be seen in cases such as Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008). See also
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004)
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squarely admitted—and indeed, has sometimes denied—that a rigorous
14
form of rational basis scrutiny exists. But exist it does, whether or not
the Court admits it: several Supreme Court decisions have squarely
placed the burden on the government to justify a challenged legal
restriction, while either purporting to apply the usual, deferential
15
rational basis test or reciting that test.
Unfortunately, the Court’s
refusal to admit the existence of this form of scrutiny means that the
Court has never explained what triggers it or what satisfies it.
The Supreme Court most recently used rigorous rational basis
scrutiny was in Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court struck
16
Other examples include
down Texas’s ban on same-sex sodomy.
Romer v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado constitutional
amendment that forbade state and local governments from outlawing
17
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, which struck down a city zoning regulation that
required a special use permit before a group home for persons with
18
mental disabilities could operate; Plyler v. Doe, which struck down
19
Texas’s ban on school funding for illegal immigrant children; and
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, which struck down a
federal regulation that denied food stamps to households that contained
20
unmarried adults.
Lower courts have been injecting rigor into rational basis scrutiny as
well. As mentioned above, the Ninth Circuit did so when it declared
21
Proposition 8 unconstitutional, and the First Circuit did so when it
22
struck down DOMA’s restrictive definition of marriage. The Ninth
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[T]he classification at issue . . . burdens personal relationships and
exudes animus against a politically unpopular group,” and such “statutes have consistently
failed rational basis review.” (emphasis added)).
14. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367–68 (2001).
15. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 635–36 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); U.S. Dep’t. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528–29, 538
(1973).
16. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
17. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635–36.
18. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
19. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
20. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529, 538.
21. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth
v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012).
22. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.
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Circuit also used rigorous rational basis scrutiny to vacate and remand a
23
district court decision that had upheld “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”
Judges on the Eleventh Circuit have tussled over whether the standard
should apply to laws preventing gay men and lesbians from adopting
24
25
children or banning sex toys.
Two analytic moves characterize rigorous rational basis scrutiny. As
with strict and intermediate scrutiny, when the Court applies rigorous
rational basis scrutiny it presumes that the legislation is
26
unconstitutional. The state must prove that the law has a legitimate
27
state purpose and that the classification furthers the state interest. As
2012) (“Supreme Court equal protection decisions have both intensified scrutiny of purported
justifications where minorities are subject to discrepant treatment and have limited the
permissible justifications.” (emphasis added)).
23. Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Lawrence requires
something more than traditional rational basis review and that remand [of the district court’s
decision dismissing the plaintiff’s challenge to ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’] is therefore
appropriate.”).
24. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (11th
Cir. 2004). In a dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Barkett, who would have
declared unconstitutional the Florida law forbidding gay men and lesbians from adopting
children, writes that she would have applied a more searching form of rational basis review.
In this case, Judge Barkett explained, “the classification at issue . . . burdens personal
relationships and exudes animus against a politically unpopular group. Under these
circumstances, statutes have consistently failed rational basis review.” Id. at 1292 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting). The panel, however, had used the deferential version of rational basis scrutiny.
The panel explained that, under the “deferential standard [of rational basis review], a
legislative classification ‘is accorded a strong presumption of validity,’ and ‘must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification.’” Id. at 1277 (majority opinion) (citations
omitted) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993)).
25. Compare Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004)
(reversing district court’s decision that the sex toy ban was unconstitutional because there was
no general liberty in sexual expression that justified any measure of heightened scrutiny), with
Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1284 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (noting that in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
held that an interest in public morality is not a “legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual” (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
26. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (holding that because the statute furthered “no legitimate
state interest,” the statute must be declared unconstitutional); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224
(1982) (explaining that in order to be constitutional the statute must “further[] some
substantial goal of the State”).
27. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
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with strict and intermediate scrutiny, not all state interests suffice to
discharge the state’s burden. Moral objections to the group’s conduct or
28
29
30
to the group itself, under-inclusive or over-inclusive justifications will
not discharge the state’s burden.
In contrast, under regular rational basis analysis the challenger, not
the state, bears the burden of proof. The challenger must “negative
31
every conceivable basis which might support [the law].” The state has
free rein to define its purposes. Moral reasons alone defeat challenges
32
to the legitimacy of the state’s interest—as Barnes v. Glen Theatre and
33
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. attest. A bare assertion by the state that the
classification furthers the state interest can defeat claims that the means
a law employs fit poorly with its stated justification—as McGowan v.
34
35
Maryland and United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz show.
The Court generally defers to the state’s assertions about how the
classification furthers the state’s purported interest, and it tolerates a

Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985) (“[The city’s] concern with the possibility of a flood . . . can
hardly be based on a distinction between the Featherston home [for persons with mental
disabilities] and, for example, nursing homes, homes for convalescents or the aged, or
sanitariums or hospitals, any of which could be located on the Featherston site without
obtaining a special use permit”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 (finding that barring undocumented
alien children from public school is unconstitutional where “[t]here is no evidence in the
record suggesting that illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State's economy.
To the contrary, the available evidence suggests that illegal aliens underutilize public services,
while contributing their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.”).
28. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216).
29. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
30. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that the Colorado constitutional
amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”).
31. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
32. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991).
33. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 301–02 (2000) (upholding a statute
prohibiting fully nude dancing similar to the statute in Barnes because it is sufficiently related
to asserted governmental interests in morality).
34. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450–52 (1961) (accepting at face value
state’s justification that store-closing laws on Sunday, the traditional Christian day of
Sabbath, provided citizens with a day of rest and recreation rather than arriving at the
obvious conclusion, which is that such laws are based in sectarian, moral concerns).
35. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177, 179 (1980) (upholding government
board’s decision to eliminate dual, “windfall” retirement benefits for only one class of
railroad retirees—those who had worked fewer than twenty-five years for a railroad and who
were not currently connected with any railroad).
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36

fair degree of both over- and under-inclusivity.
These analytic differences decide cases. Regular rational basis
scrutiny is scrutiny in name only, and laws virtually always survive its
37
gaze. In every case in which courts have applied rigorous rational basis
scrutiny, however, the added rigor has proved fatal to the challenged
38
law.
Given that cases turn on whether rigorous or regular rational basis
scrutiny is employed, it would be useful to know what criteria lead
courts to opt for rigor. The Court has never addressed what triggers the
fatal form of rational basis scrutiny, however. It has often tried to
39
conceal that it is applying a heightened form of scrutiny. Moreno and
40
Cleburne parroted the regular rational basis standard, while at the
same time shifting the burden of proof to the state and insisting on a
tailored fit between the statute’s classification and purpose. In Garrett,
the Court’s majority opinion denied that Cleburne had applied anything

36. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1949) (upholding
ban on advertising trucks in New York despite significant over- and under-inclusivity).
37. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9, 14 (1st.
Cir. 2012) (“Equal protection claims tested by this rational basis standard, famously called by
Justice Holmes the ‘last resort of constitutional argument,’ rarely succeed.” (citation omitted)
(quoting Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927))); McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425–26 (“State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that,
in practice, their laws result in some inequality. [As such, a] statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 724 (3d ed. 2009) (observing that it is “rare” that a
law will ever fail rational basis scrutiny and citing only Romer v. Evans and City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. as exceptions to that rule); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing rational basis review as “minimal scrutiny in theory
and virtually none in fact”).
38. Some state courts have followed this lead. Rigorous rational basis scrutiny also
served as the basis for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’s decision in Goodridge
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960–61, 968 (Mass. 2003), and as one basis for the
San Francisco Superior Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases. In re Coordination
Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, No. 4635, 2005 WL 583129, at *4–5
(Cal. Superior Mar. 14, 2005), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/legaldocs/downloads/in-re-marriage_ca_20050413_decision-ca-superior-court.pdf. Both cases held
unconstitutional state bans on same-sex marriage. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941; In re
Marriage Cases, No. 4635, 2005 WL 583129.
39. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–36 (1973).
40. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(“[L]egislation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and others must be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”).
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41

but regular rational basis scrutiny.
Both Lawrence and Romer
sidestepped the issue of standard of review entirely while placing the
burden of justifying the law on the state and condemning some state
42
interests as irrational animus.
This article identifies and analyzes the circumstances that lead courts
43
to inject rigor into rational basis analysis. This analysis rationalizes the
Supreme Court’s doctrine and thus may provide guidance to judges and
litigants operating in this quickly evolving area of law. This article also
breaks new ground in two areas. First, it explains why and the
conditions under which the Constitution should be read to provide to
groups greater protection than it provides to persons not considered
group members. Second, drawing on the recent literature on “nudges,”
it explains why rigorous rational basis scrutiny, rather than intermediate
or strict scrutiny, has been the appropriate response to the
discriminations experienced by gay men and lesbians, persons with

41. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001).
42. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996). To the extent the Court has said
anything on this topic it has limited the scope of scrutiny by fiat. Lawrence, for example,
holds that gay men and lesbians have the right to pursue same-sex relationships free of
criminal stigma. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). This holding could imply a
principle of relational autonomy that commits the Court to striking bans on same-sex
marriage. The majority, however, declares that the principle applied in Lawrence extends no
further than the sexual privacy rights of gay men and lesbians. See id.
43. Others have ably documented both rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s existence and
strength. See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause
and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model
and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 233 (2002) (“In some cases, a
‘third-order’ rational review is also used by the Court[, and] . . . in these cases the burden
shifts to the government to prove that the governmental action is constitutional.”); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the
(Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1264–65 (2008) (“[T]he equal
protection context, [the Court] has sometimes required ‘rationality with bite’ in place of the
traditional rationality test.” (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–33; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–42,
447; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982))); Calvin Massey, The Constitution in a Postmodern
Age, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 194–96 (2007) (describing how the Court has refused to
accept as true the state’s stated purpose for the law and searched for the “actual purpose”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59 (1996)
(arguing that “[i]n a handful of cases, rationality review has actually meant something” (citing
Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35)). As a result,
this article will not dwell on the Court’s implausible denials to the contrary. But see Daniel
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 264 (1996) (“We
would like to explore a third possibility: that the [Romer] majority was correct to invalidate
the law without using heightened scrutiny.”).
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disabilities, illegal aliens, and hippies. It also explains how these two
circuit court cases exemplify the best kind of “nudge” and are likely to
45
be upheld by the Supreme Court.
This article will proceed as follows. Part II demonstrates how the
Court’s conclusion that a group has been the target of discrimination
triggers rigorous rational basis scrutiny. Part III shows that previous
attempts to define groups for the purpose of constitutional protection do
not work in this context. Part IV provides an alternative understanding
that both makes sense and fits the case law better than competing
explanations. Part V explains why protecting groups and treating them
as the unit of analysis is desirable and why rigorous rational basis
scrutiny is the appropriate level of scrutiny for restrictions on most
groups.
This analysis yields three important conclusions. First, it is pointless
to ask, “What is a group?” without also asking, “Why do you care?”
What counts as a group depends on the purposes served by extending
constitutional protection to groups.
Efforts to create universal
principles for constitutional protection, such as “discreteness and
insularity,” will always prove unsatisfactory because guaranteeing the
equal protection of the laws to different groups of people require
protections from different kinds of harm. The context of heightened
rational basis scrutiny suggests that the definition of groups under this
doctrine will be a function of the reasons why animus against groups is
distinct from moral disapproval of certain conduct.
Second, the Court’s substantive due process and equal protection
jurisprudence may be reconciled with the leading normative
justifications for the Court’s power to strike legislation. These doctrines
have been persuasively attacked as inconsistent with the leading
normative justification for the Court’s power to negative legislation—
46
John Hart Ely’s theory of representation reinforcement. This paper
resolves this apparent inconsistency. The Court has used rigorous
rational basis scrutiny to protect groups when they are particularly
vulnerable to political backlash based on beliefs about a group’s lesser

44. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (2000).
45. See id.
46. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 54 (1994) (arguing that “the Court's equal protection jurisprudence has
shown an ‘inverted Carolene’ quality”).
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moral worth that is likely to indefinitely cement a group’s subordinate
status.
Third, rigorous rational basis scrutiny can be defended as enhancing
democratic values. Unlike strict scrutiny, rigorous rational basis
scrutiny is not a trump card that can be played to insulate a group
generally from group-based restrictions. Instead, it is a thin measure of
constitutional protection. It requires others to tolerate the group’s
existence and engage them in rational political debate about the costs
and benefits of laws that restrict group members’ ability to exercise
liberties and privileges that are generally available to others. Ironically,
this thin measure of protection can prove to be more effective in
increasing the rights of such groups by avoiding the kind of political and
social backlash that harsher medicine like strict scrutiny can provoke.
II. THE HISTORY OF RIGOROUS RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY
A. The Development of the Doctrine
Since its debut in United States Department of Agriculture v.
47
Moreno rigorous rational basis scrutiny has protected some groups
from discriminatory treatment by the state. Moreno arose when, in the
late 1960s, Congress denied food stamps to individuals who lived in
48
households with other unmarried, unrelated adults. The law’s target
was clear: Congress did not want hippies in communes to live off the
49
The Court struck down this food stamp
government’s largesse.
restriction, purportedly on rational basis grounds. The Court held:
The challenged classification clearly cannot be sustained by
reference to this congressional purpose. For if the constitutional
conception of “equal protection of the laws” means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to
harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest. As a result, “[a] purpose to discriminate
against hippies cannot, in and of itself and without reference to
[some independent] considerations in the public interest, justify

47. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534, 538 (holding that, despite the multiple reasons given by
the Government, the food stamp exclusion was still “without any rational basis” because it
did not “further some legitimate governmental interest”).
48. Id. at 529.
49. Id. at 534 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.)); 116 CONG. REC.
44,439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Spessard Holland).
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50

The Court uses the word “legitimate”—a rational basis concept—but
51
Under standard rational basis analysis, this
its use is misleading.
restriction on food stamps would have been easily upheld. Laws satisfy
rational basis if “any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify” a law, regardless whether that “reasoning . . . in fact underl[ies]
52
the legislative decision.” Congress could permissibly solve just part of
the problem of hunger and distinguish among subclasses of low-income
53
people. It might have concluded, as the appellate brief argued, that
including households comprised of unmarried, unrelated adults could
54
facilitate food stamp fraud. It could rationally posit that households
comprised of unmarried adults are more likely to move or break up than
55
households made up of married couples or relatives. Such households
also might skirt income restrictions more easily by concealing financial
56
support from parents. These concerns are at least as plausible as New
York City’s supposed concern, accepted by the Court in Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, that vehicles bearing advertisements
would distract other drivers and pedestrians from safe passage on city
streets and sidewalks and create worrisome levels of noise and visual
57
pollution.
58
The rational basis doctrine does no work in Moreno. Rather, the
critical language is “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular

50. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534–35 (alterations in original) (first emphasis added) (quoting
Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 n.11 (D.D.C. 1972)).
51. See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
52. See Brief for the Appellants at 11–12, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (No. 72-534), 1973 WL 173826, at *6 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485
(1970); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
53. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (holding
that regulation of only some of the causes of traffic distractions was allowable because equal
protection does not require that “all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all”).
54. See Brief for the Appellants, supra note 52, at 14–15.
55. See id. at 16.
56. See id.
57. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 336 U.S. at 107, 110 (stating that the city’s conclusion that
“advertising vehicle[s]” should be regulated because of the noise and traffic problems they
cause is “an allowable one” even though city regulation left untouched “even greater ones . . .
such as the vivid displays on Times Square”).
58. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533–36, 538 (1973) (analyzing
Congressional justification for the 1971 amendment to the food stamp law and dismissing all
reasons given as being “wholly without any rational basis”).
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group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.” Here, the
plaintiffs showed that Congress objected to supporting commune60
dwelling hippies.
Conjectures about other conceivable purposes
Congress could have had in mind could not dispel the evidence that “a
bare . . . desire to harm “hippies spurred Congress to impose the food
61
stamp restriction.
Only proof that another reason, free of group
animus, actually impelled Congress’s restriction could dispel that
62
conclusion. Consequently, the Court shifted the burden of justifying
63
the restriction to the government. The government thus had to prove
that, aside from disapproval of hippies and the hippie lifestyle, some
64
additional reason genuinely accounted for the food stamp restriction.
The government could not produce some other genuine reason for
65
Congress’s restriction, so the law failed.
The Court next used heightened rational basis scrutiny in Plyler v.
Doe to strike a Texas law that prohibited school districts from admitting
66
undocumented alien children or using state funds to educate them. It
would have sufficed under regular rational basis scrutiny for the state to
assert that it restricted illegal aliens in order to husband scarce
59. Id. at 534 (first emphasis added).
60. See Brief for Appellees at 19–20, Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (No. 72-534). The brief for
the appellees highlighted the few pieces of evidence from the legislative history indicating
that the restriction was targeted at hippies and communes. Id. First, the Chair of the Senate
Agriculture Committee and another Senator on the Conference Committee explained that
excluding “hippy communes” was the purpose of the restriction. Id. at 19. Second, several
members of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs later bemoaned
that the “‘the so-called “anti-hippie commune” provision’ . . . was being used to cut off
families ‘who might happen to have “taken in” a friend out of kindness.’” Id. at 19 n.9
(quoting 117 CONG. REC. 14,027 (1971) (letter from Sens. Henry Bellmon, Marlow Cook,
Robert Dole, Charles Percy, Richard Schweiker, and Robert Taft, Jr., to Secretary Clifford
Hardin)). Finally, one other piece of evidence exists—the Statement of Managers on the Part
of the House included in the Conference Report explains that the restriction was intended to
“prohibit food stamp assistance to communal ‘families’ of unrelated individuals.” See H.R.
REP. NO. 91-1793, at 8 (1970) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
61. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
62. See id. at 534–35.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 538. Such a reason was not difficult to produce as Congress could have
worried quite rationally that such households could commit fraud more easily, as individual
members of the household might each be receiving support money from their parents that
went unreported. Had the Court been in its usual deferential rational basis frame of mind, it
surely could have drummed up this reason or a similar one.
66. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205, 229–30 (1982).
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educational resources and enhance educational opportunities for Texas
citizens and legal aliens and to discourage the migration of illegal aliens
67
to Texas.
Illegal aliens, like hippies, are not a suspect class, and
68
education is not a fundamental right. Just as zero plus zero equals
zero, usually states have a free hand to regulate an unprotected class’s
69
unprotected rights.
The Plyler Court did its math differently. Under the “new math” of
heightened rational basis scrutiny, Texas’s flimsy assertions did not
70
justify its restriction. As the Court saw it, Texas’s restriction on illegal
71
alien children did not save all that much money. Texas also failed to
prove how excluding undocumented children either improved education
72
for other students or discouraged illegal migration to Texas. Excluding
these children from public school, however, did ensure their illiteracy
and condemn them as permanent outsiders in America.
Grim
consequences, indeed, though perhaps Texas’s policy should not have
gotten all the blame. Undocumented alien children already were and
would remain outsiders. Federal law, not Texas law, forbade their
presence in the United States, making them outsiders and pushing them
73
to the margins of society. Learning to speak, read, and write English in
Texas schools would not change this legal status.
Plyler’s heightened rational basis scrutiny bit even harder than
Moreno’s. Texas demonstrated some cost savings and some benefits to
74
its educational system. It estimated that the Houston public schools
alone enrolled between 4210 and 5625 undocumented alien children at a
75
cost between $500 and $700 per child per year. Many schools were
76
tremendously overcrowded and thousands of students attended school

67. See id. at 228–30.
68. See id. at 223.
69. See id. at 216–17.
70. Id. at 230.
71. Id. at 229–30.
72. Id. at 228–29.
73. Id. at 223.
74. In contrast, in Moreno, the Government did not argue that denying food stamps to
an entire class of people would save the government money. See generally U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). That it would save money was obvious and perhaps
offering that as a justification would have been tautological.
75. Brief for the Appellants at 8, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (Nos. 80-1538 & 801934), 1981 WL 389967, at *6.
76. Id. at 10.
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in small, stifling portable classrooms because voters refused to approve
77
school bonds and tax increases. Keeping illegal immigrant children out
of its schools would save Texas over $2 million per year and alleviate at
least some overcrowding. Such evidence would have easily satisfied
78
regular rational basis scrutiny, but it was not enough to discharge
79
Texas’s burden under this more rigorous form.
In fact, Plyler’s rigorous rational basis scrutiny has more in common
with the heightened scrutiny that the plurality applied in Frontiero v.
80
Richardson, one of the early sex discrimination cases. There, the
plurality rejected the government’s reasons for its requirement that
married women in the armed services prove that their husbands were
dependent on them before they were eligible to receive increased
housing allowances and medical and dental coverage for their spouses;
married men in the armed services automatically received these
81
benefits. This practice, just like Texas’s, saved the government money
over a requirement that automatically granted these benefits to all
82
married members of the armed services.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny also doomed a city zoning restriction
that blocked Cleburne Living Center, a group home for persons with
mental disabilities, from opening in a neighborhood in the city of
83
Cleburne. A city ordinance required special use permits for homes for
77. Id. at 6–7.
78. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9, 14 (1st Cir.
2012) (observing that Congress’s belief that a program would save the government money
would satisfy traditional rational basis scrutiny, even if it turned out that Congress
miscalculated).
79. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24; see also Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9, 14 (observing that
when the desire to husband scarce resources “is drawn against a historically disadvantaged
group and has no other basis, Supreme Court precedent marks this as a reason undermining
rather than bolstering the distinction” (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227)); Moreno, 413 U.S. at
533–36 (rejecting the government’s contention that avoiding food stamp fraud justified the
restrictions on eligibility).
80. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (explaining that the
classification in question can only be upheld if the government can demonstrate with
“concrete evidence” that the differential treatment saves money).
81. Id. at 690–91.
82. Cf. id. at 689 (holding that to justify its differential treatment of women, the
government would have to prove something impossible: that its current scheme of granting
benefits automatically to married men saved it more money than a gender neutral scheme
that would require both men and women to prove a spouse’s dependency to be eligible for
extra benefits).
83. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (reasoning
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“the insane or feeble-minded,” “alcoholics,” and “drug addicts,” and it
84
had denied one to Cleburne Living Center.
City law, however,
permitted fraternity houses, hospitals, and old-folks’ homes in this
85
neighborhood without special permits.
People with mental disabilities were not a suspect category, the
86
Court held. The Court recited the rational basis test, but it scrutinized
87
the City’s action more closely. The City denied the permit because it
worried about the “negative attitudes” of nearby property owners and
88
of students at a nearby junior high school, and about possible injuries
89
to the home’s residents in the case of a flood.
Fraternity houses,
hospitals, and nursing homes could certainly provoke the same
concerns, but the City permitted them, and rational basis analysis often
90
tolerates under-inclusive regulations. In this case, though, the Court
held that under-inclusivity proved that the city had violated the Equal
91
Protection Clause. Fraternity houses, hospitals, and nursing homes
could also drive down property values, and their residents would be as
92
vulnerable as persons with mental disabilities in the event of a flood.
93
Yet the City put no restrictions on these establishments. City concerns
about the neighborhood’s negative attitudes toward Cleburne Living
Center merely proved the City’s “irrational prejudice against the
94
mentally retarded.”
Echoing Moreno, the Court concluded that
nothing more than “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
95
group” drove the City’s restriction.
The Court’s opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick demonstrates the force

that because the City cannot justify its view that mentally retarded individuals cannot live in
crowded conditions while others can the ordinance is an “irrational prejudice”).
84. Id. at 436–37 & n.3.
85. Id. at 474–75.
86. Id. at 442–43, 446.
87. Id. at 442, 446.
88. Id. at 448–49.
89. Id. at 449 (noting that the home was situated on a “five hundred year flood plain”).
90. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (“It is no
requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at
all.”).
91. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449.
92. See id. at 450.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 447 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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of rigorous rational basis scrutiny in Moreno, Plyler, and Cleburne.
Just one year after Cleburne, the Court held that Georgia’s ban on
homosexual sodomy easily met rational basis scrutiny, though Georgia
97
offered no reasons besides moral disapproval of gay men and lesbians.
Let me turn now to discussing that case and the cases that ultimately
overruled it.
B. Homosexuality and Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny—When Does a
Law Restrict Acts, and When Does It Target a Group?
The previous section showed how rigorous rational basis scrutiny
forces states to justify the rationality of treating one group of persons
differently than others. For some groups, then, the Court has created a
98
prima facie freedom from government regulation. Not all groups or
classifications possess this prima facie right. Soon after Cleburne, the
Court heard Mr. Hardwick’s claim that Georgia’s anti-sodomy law
violated his liberty to engage in private, intimate conduct within his
99
home without due process law. He had been arrested in his bedroom
100
for having sex with another man.
(He did not claim that the law
violated his equal protection rights, though Georgia conceded that it
101
would not enforce the law against married, heterosexual persons.)
The Court reviewed Georgia’s anti-sodomy law under regular
rational basis scrutiny. Mr. Hardwick bore the burden of establishing
102
the law’s illegitimacy.
The Court characterized Mr. Hardwick’s
argument that his arrest violated his privacy and liberty rights as

96. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that “the presumed belief
. . . that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” satisfies rational basis review, and
therefore, the Georgia law is constitutional), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559,
578 (2003).
97. Id.
98. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
99. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
100. Id. at 187–88.
101. See id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that while Hardwick’s standing
may rest on the state’s unequal enforcement of the law, his claim “involves an
unconstitutional intrusion into his privacy and his right of intimate association”).
102. See id. at 196 (majority opinion). The Court reasoned that there was no history and
tradition of such a right because laws prohibiting sodomy had “ancient roots.” Id. at 192.
The common law had criminalized it; all of the original thirteen states had forbidden it at the
time they ratified the Bill of Rights, and “until 1961, all 50 states [had] outlawed sodomy.” Id.
at 192–93.
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103

“facetious.” No fundamental right to engage in “homosexual sodomy”
104
existed. The law easily met regular rational basis scrutiny even though
Georgia had no reason to restrict homosexual sodomy “other than the
presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
105
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.” Morality was just
fine by the Court: “The law . . . is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy
106
indeed.”
Both Bowers and Cleburne reviewed restrictions on the rights of a
non-suspect class, but Bowers’s brand of rational basis could not have
107
Georgia’s moral objections to
been more different than Cleburne’s.
the conduct of gay men and its concerns about the spread of AIDS and
108
Hepatitis satisfied the rational basis standard. The City of Cleburne’s
fears about persons with mental disabilities, however, did not. Fears
about persons with disabilities were just impermissible group animus,
and they doomed the regulation.
Bowers was not the last word on gay men, lesbians, rational basis
scrutiny, and the Constitution, of course. Ten years later, the Court
struck down a 1992 Colorado constitutional amendment that forbade
the State of Colorado and local governments from enacting laws aimed
109
at protecting people from sexual orientation discrimination.
Amendment 2 meant that if gay men and lesbians wanted legal
protection from sexual orientation discrimination, they would have to
110
amend the state constitution. Colorado tried to downplay the effect of
Amendment 2: it just “put[] gays and lesbians in the same [legal]
position as all other persons.” After all, people may freely discriminate

103. Id. at 194.
104. Id. at 196.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (finding that moral justifications satisfy rational
basis scrutiny), with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47
(1985) (holding that a legitimate governmental purpose must be behind discriminatory
statutes and that “bare . . . desire to harm” unpopular groups does not suffice) (citing U.S.
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
108. Brief of Petitioner at 37, Bowers, 478 U.S. 186 (No. 85-140), 1985 WL 667939,
at *17.
109. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623, 627, 635–36 (1996).
110. Id. at 627 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284–85 (Colo. 1993)).
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against one another on any basis except for special, prohibited bases,
111
such as race, sex, national origin, religion, and color.
The Court would have none of that. Amendment 2 “deni[ed] . . .
equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense” by making it
harder “for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the
112
government.” This hostility to Colorado’s characterization of the law
set the tone for the rest of the Court’s analysis.
The Court never stated the standard of review that it was applying,
but it appeared to place the burden of proving the law’s rationality and
legitimacy squarely on Colorado. Amendment 2, Colorado argued, was
meant to protect the rights of religious persons and to preserve scarce
113
state resources for fighting more pressing kinds of discrimination.
These reasons did not justify the law, the Court held, because
114
Amendment 2 bore no “rational relationship” to these interests. The
breadth of the legal disability imposed by the amendment on gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals was completely “discontinuous with the reasons
115
offered for . . . the amendment.”
So discontinuous, the Court found
that only “animosity” toward gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals could
116
explain it. Animus towards a group is never a “legitimate” reason for
117
“[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal
state regulation.
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean
that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
118
constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”
The Court’s analysis in Romer tracks Cleburne, Moreno, and Plyler,
119
not Bowers.
Colorado could not make it harder for gay men and
111. See id. at 626 (“[T]he State says[] the measure does no more than deny
homosexuals special rights.”).
112. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 635.
114. Id. at 632.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 634.
117. Compare id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))
(“[D]esire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that the “belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable”
constitutes a rational, legitimate state interest), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003).
118. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (alteration in original) (first emphasis added) (quoting
Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
119. Compare id. at 635 (ruling that Amendment 2 and the rationale given for it neither
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lesbians to get anti-discrimination laws passed because some objected to
homosexuality for religious reasons, while Georgia could arrest and jail
gay men because some believed same-sex sodomy was immoral.
Was Bowers’s regular rational basis the exception and the rigorous
rational basis of Romer, Cleburne, Plyler, and Moreno the rule for
discrimination against groups? In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court
120
answered that question in the affirmative. John Lawrence and Tyron
Gardner were charged and convicted under a Texas state law
prohibiting same-sex sodomy after police said that they discovered them
121
having consensual sex in Mr. Lawrence’s bedroom. Lawrence struck
down that law, holding that bans on same-sex sodomy and bans against
sodomy more generally between consenting adults violated the
122
Fourteenth Amendment.
Lawrence said nothing about the standard of review. The Court’s
reasoning, however, hewed to the rigorous rational basis review cases:
the State of Texas, not the challengers, shouldered the burden of
justifying the law, and an interest in morality could not discharge that
123
burden.
The Court concluded that the law was unconstitutional
because it invaded liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth
124
125
126
Amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v.
127
Wade, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.

state nor are sufficiently related to a legitimate state interest), with City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (holding that a legitimate
governmental purpose must be behind discriminatory statutes and that “bare . . . desire to
harm” unpopular groups does not suffice (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)), Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that the State’s goal of lowering education costs did not suffice
as “further[ing] some substantial state interest”), Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538 (holding that every
law need not “be drawn with precise ‘mathematical nicety’” but that any reasons the state
gave for the food stamp law revision were “imprecise” and “wholly without any rational
basis” (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970))), and Bowers, 478 U.S. at
196 (holding that the “belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable” constitutes a rational legitimate state interest).
120. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559, 577–78 (2003).
121. Id. at 562–63; DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, at xi–xii (2012).
122. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
123. Id. at 577–78.
124. Id. at 578.
125. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
126. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972).
127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 164 (1973).
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128

129

Casey were the most relevant precedents to this case—not Bowers.
These cases established that individuals were free to have private sexual
relationships without government interference, even with same-sex
partners. The Court explained:
[A]dults may choose to enter [into sexual relationships] in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives and still
retain their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
130
persons the right to make this choice.
On this basis, the Court held that laws prohibiting same-sex sodomy
and laws prohibiting sodomy more generally violated the due process
131
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Standing Bowers’s reasoning on its head, the Court also concluded
that Texas’s moral objections to same-sex sodomy compounded the
132
constitutional violation.
Prohibiting an activity because the state
deems it immoral and deviant inevitably stigmatizes and demeans the
people who engage in it. Gay men and lesbians, like people with mental
133
134
disabilities and illegal immigrant children, have the right not to be
made into legal or social outsiders.

128. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 877, 893–95 (1992).
129. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–79 (2003) (discussing at length why Griswold,
Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey control, rather than Bowers).
130. Id. at 567.
131. Id. at 578. Texas’s ban on same-sex sodomy had an additional flaw, because it
deprived gay men and lesbians of the equal protection of the laws.
Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct
protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important
respects . . . . When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.
Id. at 575.
132. See id. at 578.
133. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding
that excluding mentally retarded individuals from certain areas constitutes an irrational
prejudice against that group of individuals).
134. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that a statute denying immigrant
children access to free public education isolates a “discrete group of innocent children” and
without a substantial state interest the statute is unconstitutional).

08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/6/2013 9:28 PM

LIFTING THE VEIL

399

In sum, several different Supreme Court cases have forbidden states
from restricting the rights or liberties of some groups based solely on the
community’s moral distaste for some conduct that is closely associated
with some particular group or out of dislike for or disapproval of the
group itself. This burden of proof inverts rational basis scrutiny. Under
that test, challengers (here the affected groups) shoulder the Herculean
task of proving a negative—that the state’s regulation serves no purpose
135
at all, including the moral welfare of the citizenry. In contrast, when
states regulate rights or liberties of some groups, states must, at a
minimum, prove that the exercise of these rights or liberties—generally
or when exercised by members of this group—cause some identifiable
136
harm to the persons or property of third parties.
In essence, by reversing the burden of proof ordinarily employed in
rational basis scrutiny, rigorous rational basis scrutiny forces the state to
treat these groups as members of the political community. These groups
have a prima facie right to exist and a prima facie right to exercise rights
and liberties that are generally available to others. These prima facie
rights attach to individuals, without regard to their membership in a
group or class, but their membership in a group is relevant to the extent
that they cannot be singled out for disadvantageous treatment by reason
of that membership. The state can only rebut this prima facie right by
proving that group members’ exercise of some right or liberty actually
harms the persons or property of third parties. Fears that a group’s
activities might cause some harm will not do. The state must act
dispassionately and based on proof that the group and its activities do or
will cause some harm to third parties. The state must also establish that
lesser restrictions or generally applicable restrictions cannot avoid those
harms.
Recent circuit court decisions regarding the rights of gay men and
lesbians have identified discrimination against certain social groups as
137
the key factor triggering rigorous rational basis scrutiny. The circuit
judges have echoed the Court’s suspicion about singling out groups for
138
disfavored treatment and applied rigorous rational basis scrutiny.

135. See supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text.
136. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 572, 578 (2003); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223, 228.
137. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.
2012); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.,
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012).
138. See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 11; Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089.
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First, discussing the line of cases running from Moreno to Lawrence, the
First Circuit observed, “[T]he Supreme Court has now several times
struck down state or local enactments without invoking any suspect
classification.
In each, the protesting group was historically
disadvantaged or unpopular, and the statutory justification seemed thin,
139
unsupported or impermissible.”
The First Circuit concluded that through these cases the Court has
tightened up rational basis scrutiny: “The Court has in these cases
undertaken a more careful assessment of the justifications than the light
140
scrutiny offered by conventional rational basis review.”
Second, in Witt v. Department of the Air Force, the Ninth Circuit
remanded a district court’s decision upholding the “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy for reconsideration because the district court had upheld
141
the policy under traditional deferential rational basis review.
The
court wrote, “We cannot reconcile what the Supreme Court did in
Lawrence with the minimal protections afforded by traditional rational
basis review[,]” and so “something more than traditional rational basis
142
review” must apply to discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Finally, Perry v. Brown also tightened up rational basis scrutiny
because California’s Proposition 8 withdrew “a privilege or protection
143
. . . from a class of disfavored individuals.” When a law burdens such a
group, rational basis scrutiny is not “toothless” and requires that the
144
restriction “must find some footing in the realities of the subject.”
Moral disapproval of the group and its practices does not satisfy this
145
burden. The Perry court concluded, “we must infer from Proposition
8’s effect on California law that the People took away from gays and
lesbians the right to use the official designation of ‘marriage’—and the
societal status that accompanies it—because they disapproved of these

139. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 820–22 (9th Cir. 2008).
142. Id. at 816–17; see also Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377
F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[T]he classification at issue . . .
burdens personal relationships and exudes animus against a politically unpopular group,” and
such “statutes have consistently failed rational basis review.” (emphasis added)).
143. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1085.
144. Id. at 1089 (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 321 (1993)).
145. Id. at 1092–93.
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individuals as a class.”
The majority’s disapproval of gay men and
lesbians rendered Proposition 8 unconstitutional.
III. EXPLAINING THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
Though the results of the cases are clear enough, the reasoning
behind them is not. What are the foundations of rational basis review?
The Court’s rigorous rational basis cases seemingly have presumed that
it is self-evident when a law targets a group. This next part will
demonstrate that it is incorrect to presume that the existence of a group
is self-evident. Instead, the conclusion that a group exists is a conclusion
that must be justified relative to the laws at issue in particular cases and
the purposes served by rigorous exercise of rational basis analysis more
generally.
A. Here’s the Rub: All Laws Stigmatize and Restrict the Liberties of
Groups
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence nailed this problem on the
head—all criminal laws stigmatize the prohibited conduct and by
147
extension stigmatize people who do the prohibited act. That the Court
considered this kind of stigma unconstitutional in Lawrence led Justice
148
Scalia to believe that the Court had adopted the harm principle.
Justice Scalia’s conclusion is too quick. This part will explain how
centrally important it is to Lawrence that Texas singled out gay men and
lesbians and sought to control the sexual relationships of this group
149
alone. Contrasting Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. and Gonzales v.
150
151
Carhart with Lawrence will demonstrate this point.
146. Id. at 1093.
147. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
laws that regulate sexual behavior reflect “society’s belief that certain forms of sexual
behavior are ‘immoral and unacceptable’” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)); cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I had thought that one could consider certain conduct
reprehensible—murder, . . . or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit even
‘animus’ toward such conduct.”).
148. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has
“effectively decree[d] the end of all morals legislation”).
149. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
150. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
151. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. Part III.A draws from my earlier article on this subject.
See Miranda Oshige McGowan, From Outlaws to Ingroup: Romer, Lawrence, and the
Inevitable Normativity of Group Recognition, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1321, 1325–29 (2004).
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In Barnes, Indiana defended the application of its public indecency
152
law to nude dancers in adults-only strip clubs.
Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s plurality opinion for the Court held that the dancer’s naked
153
Over Justice Scalia’s
gyrations were First Amendment expression.
154
vituperative concurrence, the plurality required Indiana to justify the
155
The “statute’s
public indecency statute under intermediate scrutiny.
purpose,” Chief Justice Rehnquist observes, is to “protect[] societal
order and morality;” statutes like this one plainly “reflect moral
disapproval of people appearing in the nude among strangers in public
156
places.” The plurality concludes without any fuss, that bans on public
indecency fit well within the “traditional police power of the States . . .
157
to provide for the public health, safety, and morals” of their citizens.
Consequently, Indiana’s requirement that nude dancers wear pasties in
strip clubs “furthers a substantial government interest in protecting
158
order and morality.”
Indiana’s reason for prohibiting public nudity closely resembles
Texas’s reason for banning same-sex sodomy—to stigmatize nude
dancers and people who frequent nude clubs as criminals and brand
159
their conduct as indecent and immoral.
Barnes, however, upholds
Indiana’s restriction, even though the reasoning linking the statute and
public decency was more opaque than the pasties Indiana law forced
160
dancers to wear. Lap dances with pasties are not much more decent
than lap dances without pasties.

152. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 566 (explaining Indiana’s contention that the “restriction on
nude dancing is a valid ‘time, place, or manner’ restriction”).
153. See id. at 565–66 (summarizing past decisions and ultimately finding nude dancing
to be on the “outer perimeters” of First Amendment expression).
154. Justice Scalia would only have required Indiana to demonstrate that the law had a
rational basis. Id. at 580 (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 567 (plurality opinion) (holding that Indiana’s public indecency statute
“furthers substantial governmental interests”); see also id. at 579 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
plurality purports to apply . . . an intermediate level of First Amendment scrutiny . . . .”).
156. Id. at 568 (plurality opinion). To be fair, Indiana likely disapproves of people in
public being nude around their friends, too.
157. Id. at 569.
158. Id.
159. Compare id. at 568, with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (explaining
the traditional moral disapproval influencing laws such as the one at issue in the case).
160. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571–72 (upholding Indiana law on the basis that it was
narrowly tailored and was “modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the State’s
purpose”).
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Though it is true that nude dance clubs are public accommodations,
it is harder to say that the dancing occurs in public. Parents do not have
to worry that, while out in public, their children might accidentally
glimpse an erotic dancer gyrating in the nude. (That a child might
instead glimpse an erotic dancer in pasties is cold comfort indeed.) The
only “public” that ever saw nude dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge (the
Indiana strip club in Barnes) were people who knew what they would
find when they walked in off the street—and they would only be
161
offended by the club’s decency, not its indecency. The Court ignored
162
Patrons wanted to see what Indiana did not want
these problems.
them to see, and the Court let Indiana impose its moral preference that
163
the patrons’ preferences be made illegal.
How can Indiana’s moral preferences outweigh the free expression
rights of nude dancers and the liberty interests of their patrons, but
Texas’s moral preferences do not outweigh the liberty interests of gay
men and lesbians? As a legal matter, Barnes would seem to present the
164
more compelling constitutional case.
The Court assumed that the
dancing was protected expression, so the Indiana law had to satisfy
165
intermediate scrutiny. Indiana justified the statute solely on grounds
of morality, and the evidence linking the statute to any improvement in
166
Nevertheless, the
South Bend’s moral tone was at best diaphanous.
strip club goers and nude dancers lost. The Court merely asserted
167
without reasoning that Indiana’s interest in morality was substantial.
161. See id. at 563, 566.
162. See id. at 566, 569 (finding that the public indecency statute “furthers a substantial
government interest” but failing to address the Respondent’s contention that there is no
“nonconsenting” public nudity).
163. Id. at 569.
164. See id. at 565–66 (finding that exotic dancing is a form of First Amendment
expression).
165. Id. at 565–67.
166. Id. at 569.
167. Id. But see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking:
Before and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1270–71 (2004) (arguing that
Barnes signals the Court’s increasing acceptance of the harm principle because only four
justices accepted the proposition that morality standing alone could justify limits on
expression). In McGowan, supra note 151, at 1327 n.91, I explain that Professor Goldberg’s
count omits Justice Thomas, who replaced one of Barnes’s dissenters. Justice Thomas
dissented in Lawrence because—though “silly”—morality-based statutes are constitutional.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605–06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965)). Furthermore, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 158–59 (2007), supports the conclusion that states and the federal government can
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Similarly, Justice Kennedy—the author of Lawrence and Romer—
168
authored an opinion for the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart that upholds
bare disgust as a valid justification for a federal law that bans one type
of late-term abortion—dilation and extraction (D&X)—while
permitting another—dilation and evacuation (D&E)—in which the fetus
169
is removed from the uterus piece by piece.
On its face, Carhart is
flatly inconsistent with Lawrence and the other rigorous rational basis
170
cases. Supreme Court precedent prior to Gonzales puts abortions and
women on different footing than same-sex sodomy and gay men and
lesbians were on prior to Romer and Lawrence: abortion restrictions
receive heightened scrutiny and women are a protected class under
171
Supreme Court precedent.
Nevertheless, Congress’s moral conclusions—that the brutality and
grisliness of the D&X procedure assaulted the dignity of human life—
172
was enough to sustain the law. The United States offered nothing else
to support it. There was no evidence that the D&X ban would preserve
173
fetal life by reducing the overall number of abortions performed.
Federal law still permits late-term D&E abortions, which are similarly
174
gruesome and end fetal life just as conclusively. Furthermore, Carhart
upheld this ban despite plausible objections that the ban on D&X
175
abortions imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion,
176
because D&E abortions may be more dangerous for many women.
Carhart’s failure to justify why morality trumps the rights of women who
wish to have the safest type of late-term abortion demonstrates how

still pass laws that satisfy moral preferences standing alone. See supra text accompanying
notes 155–163.
168. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 130.
169. Id. at 160.
170. Compare id. at 158–61 (reasoning that moral distaste and a view that a certain
procedure is “brutal” suffices to establish legitimate government interest), with Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 577–78 (incorporating Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
171. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56 (1973).
172. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 158, 160; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 962
(2000) (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (arguing that Nebraska’s ban on D&X abortions should be
sustained because Nebraska has the “right to declare a moral difference between” D&X and
D&E abortion procedures).
173. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 182.
175. Id. at 147 (majority opinion).
176. See id. at 176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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pressing the need is for guiding principles rather than mere judicial
intuition to guide this area of equal protection and substantive due
process doctrine.
The Court appears to believe that the stigma of same-sex sodomy
laws is notable because it is directed toward gays and only gays.
Unfortunately, this objection does not really distinguish same-sex
177
sodomy laws from other laws. The public indecency statute in Barnes
surely stigmatized the men who visited totally nude clubs and the
178
dancers who performed in the nude for them. The public indecency
statute and the prosecution of the Kitty Kat Lounge reflected the state’s
moral distaste for the kinds of people who would like to appear nude in
public and who frequent totally nude clubs; Indiana offered no other
179
justification for its statute. The federal late-term abortion restrictions
177. This distinction may not be true as a factual matter, either. People who do not
identify as gay, lesbian, or bisexual sometimes experiment with having sex with partners of
the same sex. In a 1992 survey of Americans about sexuality, about 4% of women surveyed
reported that they had had sex with a woman at some point in their lives, 2% said that they
had had sex with a woman in the last year, but only 1.4% of women identified themselves as
lesbian or bisexual. ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY
174–77 (1994). The survey also found that about 3% of men had sex with men but did not
identify as gay. Id. A 2009 study found that 8.4% of girls 15–17, 13.8% of girls 18–19, and
14.2% of women 20–24 responded that they had had a sexual experience with a same-sex
partner, which is above the generous estimate that about 10% of the population is gay or
lesbian. Lorrie Gavin et al., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Sexual and Reproductive
Health of Persons Aged 10–24 Years—United States, 2002–2007, 58 MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 17, 2009, at 1, 19 tbl.2, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
preview/mmwrhtml/ss5806a1.htm. Boys and men were less likely to report same-sex
encounters (3.9% of boys 15–17, 5.1% of boys 18–19, 5.5% of men 20–24), id. at 21 tbl.3, and
it is likely their lower rate of response was because males and females were asked different
questions. Girls and women read the following from a computer screen: “The next question
asks about sexual experience you may have had with another female. Have you ever had any
sexual experience of any kind with another female?” Id. at 20 tbl.2 n.¶¶. Boys and men read:
The next questions ask about sexual experience you may have had with another
male. Have you ever done any of the following with another male? Put his penis in
your mouth (oral sex)? Put your penis in his mouth (oral sex)? Put his penis in your
rectum or butt (anal sex)? Put your penis in his rectum or butt (anal sex)?
Id. at 22 tbl.3 n.§§; see also Deirdre Dolan, Lesbian Lolitas: High-School Girls Want to Be
Gay-ish, N.Y. OBSERVER, Dec. 16, 2002, at 1 (explaining a trend among some high school
girls to experiment sexually with other girls), available at http://www.nyobserver.com/pages/st
ory.asp?ID=6716; Alex Morris, The Cuddle Puddle of Stuyvesant High School, N.Y. MAG.
(Jan. 28, 2006), http://nymag.com/news/features/15589/ (describing the “social rituals of the
pansexual, bi-queer, metroflexible New York teen”).
178. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571–72 (1991).
179. See id. at 568 (describing the statute’s “clear” purpose as “protecting societal order
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also stigmatized doctors who performed and women who had late-term
180
abortions.
Testimony before Congress likened D&X abortions to
181
infanticide.
B. Toward a Workable Distinction Between “Groups” and
“Classifications”
Why does morality trump the liberties of nude dancers and strip
club-goers but not the liberties of gay men and lesbians? Because the
Court thinks (and I would agree) that gay men and lesbians as a set are
a group, while the sets of nude dancers and people who go to strip clubs
182
are not a group in the Equal Protection Clause sense. It is therefore
more accurate to say that the Court will strike state statutes that restrict
the liberties of certain groups, if the state’s reason for the regulation is
grounded in moral distaste. The relevant question, then, is what facts
justify treating a collection of people as a group rather than just as
individuals who engage in conduct properly subject to plenary
regulation by the state.
1. Judges and Cases
It is best to begin by acknowledging that in many cases it will seem
obvious that a group exists and that a law limits the rights or liberties of
that group’s members out of simple spite. Gay men and lesbians are
undeniably a social and political group. They have their own version of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
183
(NAACP) in the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. There
are gay and lesbian organizations within both the Democratic and
Republican parties, and lobbyists advocate gay and lesbian rights on
184
Capitol Hill and in state legislatures across the nation. Every year gay

and morality”); see also id. at 569 (holding that the statute was constitutional on the sole
grounds that “order and morality” further a “substantial government interest”).
180. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000).
181. Id. at 959–60.
182. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567–72 (revealing the heart of the Court’s analysis); see also
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633–34 (1996) (explaining that “laws singling out a certain class
of citizens for disfavored legal status . . . are rare” because such laws are “denial of equal
protection . . . in the most literal sense”).
183. See LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
184. See, e.g., LOG CABIN REPUBLICANS, http://www.logcabin.org/site/c.nsKSL7PML
pF/b.5468093/k.BE4C/Home.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2012); NATIONAL STONEWALL
DEMOCRATS, http://www.stonewalldemocrats.org/about/who (last visited Dec. 2, 2012);.
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men and lesbians hold huge “Pride” parades in cities across the United
185
States. Law students can join gay and lesbian groups at most colleges
and law schools, and bar associations in many cities have gay and lesbian
sections, as does the Association of American Law Schools (AALS).
Sexual orientation also matters to a person’s self-perception. Indeed,
that is one reason why gay men and lesbians have created political and
186
How could it be
legal organizations to represent their interests.
otherwise? By definition, sexual orientation affects a person’s choice of
sexual and life partners and whether and how someone will have
187
children. It affects how others perceive that person, too.
Persons with disabilities are also an identity group. Like gay men
and lesbians, individuals with disabilities have created social, political,
and legal organizations, and employ lobbyists to represent their interests
in Congress and in statehouses. Disability shapes people’s perceptions
of and experiences in the world. It can affect a person’s opportunities
and life plans, depending on the extent to which a person requires and
receives reasonable accommodations. Knowing that a person has a
disability can also alter others’ view of that person. All of these factors
can contribute to a person’s self-identity and to the persona projected in
public.
185. See, e.g., John Leland, Cheering a Gay Marriage Law, and Its Champions, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2011, at A15; Tony Perry, Now it’s History: San Diego Gay Pride
Parade 2012, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012
/07/now-its-history-san-diego-gay-pride-parade-2012.html.
186. For example, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., the Human Rights
Campaign, and the Log Cabin Republicans exist to represent the interests of the gay, lesbian,
and bisexual community. See supra notes 183–84.
187. Same-sex couples obviously can and do raise families. The California Supreme
Court noted that based on the 2000 Census, in California alone, over 70,000 children were
being raised by same-sex couples. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433 n.50 (Cal. 2008),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. The 2010 American
Community Survey Data (produced by the U.S. Census Bureau) estimates that 17.5% of
same-sex couples have children, which is about 104,000 families in total. See American
Community Survey Data on Same Sex Couples, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, tbl.1 (2010),
http://www.census.gov/hhes/samesex/files/ssex-tables-2010.xls. The Williams Institute at the
University of California, Los Angeles, reports a slightly higher number of same-sex couples
raising children—about 110,000, which may simply reflect an increase in numbers between
2010 and 2012. Press Release, The Williams Institute, As Overall Percentage of Same-Sex
Couples Raising Children Declines, Those Adopting Almost Doubles – Significant Diversity
Among Lesbian and Gay Families (Jan. 25, 2012), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/pr
ess/press-releases/as-overall-percentage-of-same-sex-couples-raising-children-declines-thoseadopting-almost-doubles-significant-diversity-among-lesbian-and-gay-families/
(reporting
that there are now “more than 110,000” same-sex couples raising children).
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It is tempting to conclude from these two examples that the Court
extended constitutional protection to existing “identity groups.” This
conclusion proves too much. People constitute their identities in all
sorts of ways the Court would not and should not protect. A purely
descriptive notion of identity group could suggest that classes of people
like “Chicago Cubs fans” are an identity group deserving constitutional
recognition. Such a result would seem odd, just as it would seem odd for
a person to insist on choosing her spouse from only the pool of existing
Cubs fans—partly because she could well persuade her spouse to
become a Cubs fan, and partly because she might not always be a Cubs
fan. Even with regard to sexual identity, a purely descriptive notion of a
group seems unlikely to predict when the Court would apply rigorous
rational basis scrutiny. If it strikes you as unlikely that the Court would
today declare unconstitutional legislative efforts to discourage the
188
practice of the “furry” fetish or the “furry” lifestyle, then it cannot be
that the Court grants protection to some groups from restrictions based
in animus because they are identity groups. Subjective “identity” may
therefore be a necessary condition for a group to constitute itself.
Standing alone it is not a sufficient condition for constitutional
protection.
The First Circuit has said that “historic . . . disadvantage” and
189
unpopularity explain the Moreno-to-Lawrence line of cases.
While
some of the groups in that line of cases have historically been
190
Hippies—the
disadvantaged, it does not explain all of these cases.
191
group that sparked rigorous rational basis scrutiny in Moreno —were
too new a group to be historically disadvantaged. Historic disadvantage
also does not explain rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s extension to
192
illegal aliens in Plyler.
It is true that undocumented aliens are
disadvantaged and provoke feelings of prejudice and suspicion in many,
but their undocumented status causes most of their difficulties. Lack of
popularity is too powerful an explanation. Groups or members of
188. For more on “furries,” see Dan Savage, Savage Love: Furry Friends, THE
STRANGER (Aug. 8, 2002), http://www.thestranger.com/seattle/SavageLove?oid=11570.
189. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11 (2012).
190. Id.
191. See id.; see also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1973) (noting
that the food stamp regulations at issue in the case were “aimed at the ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie
communes’”).
192. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982) (extending rigorous rational basis to laws
restricting rights to undocumented aliens).
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classes who are challenging a law are unpopular enough that a majority
has been willing to disadvantage them.
The Court’s decisions also belie its assertion that “animus” towards a
group or a group’s political unpopularity triggers rigorous rational basis
193
scrutiny. Indeed, the Court’s decisions have protected groups that—
even if unpopular in many ways—have amassed significant political
194
power. Gay men and lesbians were more politically vulnerable in the
195
years leading up to 1986 than in 1996 or 2003. Most states were in the
process of repealing their anti-sodomy laws in the 1990s, and only
eighteen still banned it when Lawrence held them to be
196
unconstitutional.
Today gay men and lesbians may marry in nine
197
states and the District of Columbia. Same-sex couples have the right
to enter into relationships with the same rights and privileges that attach
198
to marriage in several other states.
In some states, courts granted
199
same-sex partners the right to marry, but in others, the right to marry
200
201
has been extended by state legislatures or by state initiatives.
Furthermore, several states prohibited sexual orientation

193. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that Colorado constitutional
amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”).
194. See supra note 184.
195. See id.
196. Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws: History and Strategy that Led to the Lawrence
Decision, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (June 26, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-right_hivaids/getting-rid-sodomy-laws-history-and-strategy-led-lawrence-decision; Carlos Maza, State
Sodomy Laws Continue to Target LGBT Americans, EQUALITY MATTERS BLOG (Apr. 08,
2011, 3:26 PM), http://equality matters.org/blog/201108080012.
197. Winning the Freedom to Marry: Progress in the States, FREEDOM TO MARRY,
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ (last updated Nov. 8, 2012) (showing a state-by-state
breakdown of marriage laws in the United States).
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (holding
that restrictions on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d
862 (Iowa 2009) (same); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 960–61, 968
(Mass. 2003).
200. See D.C. CODE § 46-401 (Supp. 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Supp.
2012); N.Y. DOM. REL. § 10-a (Supp. 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5131 (2012).
201. In November 2012, Maine, Maryland, and Washington voters passed initiatives
granting same-sex couples the right to marry. Same Sex Marriage and Domestic Partnership
on the Ballot, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/legislatur
es-elections/elections/same-sex-marriage-on-the-ballot.aspx?stateid=wa#data.
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discrimination in 2003, and several more have since.
Persons with
disabilities were more vulnerable in the 1930s when Justice Holmes
wrote his infamous opinion in Buck v. Bell than they were in 1985 when
203
the Court decided Cleburne.
Cleburne followed the Rehabilitation
Act and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act by about a
decade and preceded the Americans with Disabilities Act by five
204
years. And just four years after Plyler, Congress granted many illegal
205
aliens amnesty through the Immigration Reform and Control Act.
At the same time, the Court has expressly refused to apply
heightened scrutiny to laws that disadvantage two of the groups with the
206
207
least political clout—felons and poor people. Several states, in fact,
render even non-violent felons politically powerless by denying them
208
the right to vote after their prison sentences have been completed.
202. Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information-Map, ACLU (Sep. 21, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map.
203. Compare Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
204. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (1985); see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006));
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. (2006)); Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (2006)).
205. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359,
3394 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)).
206. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 55–56 (1974) (holding that statutory
exclusion of felons from standard voting rights does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause despite argument that it doesn’t further legitimate state interest).
207. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973) (declining
to find that poverty was a suspect class). An illustration from tax policy shows how difficult it
is to move congress to address issues affecting the poor. In 2003, as part of a general tax cut,
Congress increased the tax credit for children for most middle-class families but failed to
extend that tax credit to poor families who were eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit.
See David Firestone, DeLay Rebuffs Move to Restore Lost Tax Credit, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2003, at A1 [hereinafter Fireston, Delay]. This failure appeared to have been an error, as
President George W. Bush said that he would have supported extending the credit increase to
working poor families. See David Firestone, Bush Presses House Republicans on Credits for
Poor, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at A26 [hereinafter Firestone, Bush Presses] (reporting that
“[t]he White House all but demanded today that House Republicans quickly approve a
Senate bill to increase the child tax credit for 6.5 million low-income families” but the
President’s demands “did not immediately persuade House leaders to” do so). Nevertheless,
even with the President’s support, it took several months for Congress to fix this problem.
See Firestone, Bush Presses, supra; Firestone, Delay, supra.
208. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56; Michael McLaughlin, Felon Voting Laws

08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/6/2013 9:28 PM

LIFTING THE VEIL

411

Many others suspend felons’ rights for several years or require felons to
209
petition to have their rights restored. Recall as well that the Lawrence
Court said explicitly that the logic of Lawrence would not extend to
granting rights to such politically unpopular groups as prostitutes,
210
polygamists, or practitioners of adult incest.
Maybe, when the Court says “politically unpopular,” it means that
the group is a minority and that animus toward the group motivated the
211
legislation. Animus, the Court has emphasized, is not a sufficient or
rational basis for imposing greater burdens on a group or denying
212
liberties to its members.
The problem with this spin on the Court’s
meaning is that it makes the heightened rational basis standard
dizzyingly circular: Groups merit heightened rational basis if they have
been treated malevolently by law or government actors, but it is only
heightened scrutiny, rather than the hypothetical justifications that
suffice for ordinary rational basis scrutiny, that will uncover malevolent
purposes concealed behind the assertion of neutral ones.
Nor is “animus” shorthand for Carolene Products’ “discrete and
213
insular minorities.” A group is “discrete” and “insular” if it is unable
to bridge its gap with other members of society to form effective
214
political alliances that might better its members’ position. Some of the

Disenfranchise 5.85 Million Americans with Criminal Records: The Sentencing Project,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/12/felon-votinglaws-disenfranchise-sentencing-project_n_1665860.html.
209. See supra note 208.
210. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The present case does not involve
minors[,] . . . persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused[,] . . . public conduct or prostitution[, or] . . .
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.”).
211. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that Colorado
constitutional amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”);
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004)
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (“[T]he classification at issue . . . burdens personal relationships and
exudes animus against a politically unpopular group,” and such “statutes have consistently
failed rational basis review.” (emphasis added)).
212. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (holding that Colorado constitutional amendment’s
“sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”).
213. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
214. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that the law at issue works to
isolate and deny “a discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it offers
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Court’s rigorous rational basis decisions can surely be explained as
attempts to protect “discrete and insular minorities.” Plyler v. Doe,
which struck down Texas’s decision to bar illegal immigrant children
from public schools, makes perfect sense as a case of protecting discrete
215
and insular minorities from harm at the hands of the majority. If, as
the late John Hart Ely argued, Justice Stone’s reference to discrete and
insular minorities referred to “the sort of ‘pluralist’ wheeling and
dealing by which the various minorities that make up our society
216
typically interact to protect their interests,” there is probably no more
discrete and insular minority than illegal immigrant children. By
definition, they cannot protect—or even voice—their interests in the
political process and are at the complete mercy of those with political
power.
As an explanation for other cases, however, discreteness and
insularity simply replicates many of the same problems that there were
with using political unpopularity as the criterion triggering group status
and rigorous rational basis scrutiny. Gay men and lesbians probably
were a discrete and insular group when Professor Ely argued in
Democracy and Distrust that the Court should hold that gay men and
217
lesbians are a suspect class. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, many (if
not most) gay men and lesbians lived closeted lives and only expressed
their sexual identities when they were safe in gay and lesbian
218
neighborhoods and bars. Of course, that was when the Court handed
219
down Bowers, not Lawrence. Today, it is harder to make the case that
gay men and lesbians are a discrete and insular minority. Gay men and
220
lesbian women came out in large numbers during the 1980s and 1990s.
In doing so, gay men and lesbians engaged their communities, and the

to other children” because they come from undocumented immigrant families).
215. Id.
216. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
151 (1980).
217. Id. at 163.
218. Richard Socarides, Is The Battle For Gay Rights Over?, NEW YORKER (June 22,
2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/06/is-the-battle-for-gay-rightsover.html.
219. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (noting the dates of the decisions).
220. Michael Levy, Gay Rights Movement, BRITANNICA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/766382/gay-rights-movement (last visited Dec. 2,
2012).
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political processes of those communities, as group members rather than
simply as individual members of the broader community. That
engagement, I argue below, is an important part of the justification for
rigorous rational basis scrutiny.
Persons with disabilities also illustrate the problems with using the
discrete and insular concept to define group status. In some respects,
persons with disabilities are discrete and insular. The majority of
221
persons with serious disabilities do not have jobs, which cuts them off
from the regular social contact that comes with work. From this
222
perspective, persons with disabilities seem “discrete and insular.”
From the perspective of the ability of persons with disabilities to protect
223
their rights and interests, however, they have political clout. Members
of the disabilities rights community worked closely with Congress in
drafting, revising, and shepherding the Americans with Disabilities Act
through Congress in 1990 and in passing amendments in 2008 to
224
strengthen its protections.
In Congress’s deliberations over the
original ADA, many members of Congress spoke of the possibility that
anyone could become a person with a disability because of mishap and

221. In 2012, a little over 20% of persons with disabilities were in the labor force,
compared with about 70% of persons without disabilities. See U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Economic News Release, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, tbl.A-6, http://www.bls.gov/news.r
elease/empsit.t06.htm (last modified Oct. 5, 2012). Among those in the labor force, about
13% of persons with disabilities were unemployed, compared with about 8% those without
disabilities. Id. In 2000, the Census reported that about half of persons with a sensory
disability were employed, only a third of persons with a physical disability were, as were
about 30% of persons with mental disabilities. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, DISABILITY STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONALIZED POPULATION
BY SEX AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO
tbl.2 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-t32/tables
/tab02-US.pdf.
222. One of the most striking things about the passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act was that many members of Congress and members of the executive branch
felt personally invested in the cause of civil rights for persons with disabilities. Many of the
ADA’s congressional supporters either had disabilities themselves or had family members
who had disabilities. See Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 33 (2000). Every member of congress had colleagues who
had disabilities. Id. Just to name a few—Bob Dole, then Senate Minority Leader, had lost
use of his arm in World War II and Senator Daniel Inouye had lost his arm in the same war.
Id. Tony Coelho, the bill’s original House sponsor, had epilepsy. Id. Richard Thornburgh,
then Attorney General, had a child with mental disabilities, and President George H.W. Bush
had a son with learning disabilities and an uncle who was a quadriplegic. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
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the likelihood that they would each become disabled with age.
A
group of persons that others risk (and know they risk) joining is far less
discrete and far less insular than Blacks or gay men and lesbians.
Even worse, the Court often refuses to protect other groups that are
226
discrete and insular.
Bill Eskridge and the late Phil Frickey have
argued that the Court’s actual practice stands Carolene Products on its
227
head.
Constitutional protection follows after a group has already
amassed some political clout. “So long as a group really is politically
marginalized,” however, “the Court will tolerate virtually any action by
228
Congress or the states that adversely affects the minority.”
The
foregoing analysis certainly supports their conclusion. Their conclusion,
however, strips the Court of its leading normative justification for its
authority to negative legislation—John Hart Ely’s elaboration of Chief
Justice Stone’s footnote in Carolene Products—and leaves the Court
229
with something that looks more like might makes right.
225. Id. at 34.
226. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding that the statutory
provision does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and,
therefore, people with a felony record are not a suspect class); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137, 141 (1971) (holding that poverty is not a suspect class).
227. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 46, at 54–55 (observing that “the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence has shown an ‘inverted Carolene’ quality”); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2371–72 (2002) [hereinafter Eskridge, Effects]
(describing how “constitutional protection” is “primarily a function of the political progress a
minority group has made,” and if “socially despised and not politically organized, [the
minority group] will be subject to pervasive state segregation into inferior spheres of the
culture”).
228. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 46, at 54. Eskridge and Frickey give Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), as an
example. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 46, at 55. That case involved members of the
Satmara sect of Judaism, who lived together in isolated religious communities and educated
their children in private, religious schools. Id. Frickey and Eskridge characterize the Satmara
as “the classic ‘discrete and insular minority.’” Id. The Satmara who lived in the Village of
Kiryas Joel could not provide adequate educational services to children with learning
disabilities. Id. New York passed a special statute making Kiryas Joel its own school district
so that Satmar children with learning disabilities could receive special education services. Id.
The Supreme Court, however, struck the New York statute as amounting to an establishment
of religion in violation of the First Amendment. Id.; see also Eskridge, Effects, supra note
227, at 2372 (explaining that if a group is “completely powerless, the Supreme Court will not
protect it against suppression,” but may protect “individual victims under the libertarian
provisions of the Constitution”).
229. See ELY, supra note 216, at 151 (explaining that the group we should be protecting
are those that legislatures won’t necessarily have incentive to protect.); Eskridge, Effects,
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2. Legal Scholars’ Attempts to Describe “Groups” Fall Short
Scholars have offered various answers to this question, none of them
wholly satisfactory. In a famous article directed at equal protection (not
rigorous rational basis scrutiny), Owen Fiss advocated a group-based
230
approach to equal protection.
Although his argument was not
directed at the cases I analyze here, it is the clearest and best defense of
the proposition that the concept of a group is legally cogent and useful,
if not strictly necessary.
Fiss distinguished between groups and classifications, or, in his
terminology, between “artificial classes”—“those created by a
classification or criterion embodied in a state practice or statute”—and
231
social groups, which had an independent social identity.
A “social
group” was “more than a collection of individuals, all of whom . . .
232
happen to arrive at the same street corner at the same moment.” A
social group is “an entity” that “has a distinct existence apart from its
233
members” and “an identity.” In other words, Fiss said, other people
understand what you are talking about when you “talk about the
group,” and you can do so “without reference to the particular
234
individuals” who are its members.
Fiss’s social-recognition approach introduces an element of
subjectivity to deciding whether a collection of persons is a group, and
some scholars find that subjectivity fatal to any group-based approach to
235
constitutional law. Larry Alexander, for example, has argued that it is
a fool’s errand to base equal protection on the concept of social groups
because the concept is impossible to define and apply with any
236
precision.
Defining the paradigmatic social group of “Blacks” is

supra note 227, at 2371–72 (describing how “constitutional protection” is “primarily a
function of the political progress a minority group has made,” and if “socially despised and
not politically organized, [the minority group] will be subject to pervasive state segregation
into inferior spheres of the culture”).
230. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUBL. AFF. 107,
108 (1976).
231. Id. at 156.
232. Id. at 148.
233. Id. (emphasis omitted).
234. Id.
235. See id. at 148 (describing a social group as an entity with a “distinct existence apart
from its members” and that people subjectively “know” and recognize it’s a group).
236. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Equal Protection and the Irrelevance of
“Groups,” 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, no. 1, art. 1, Aug. 2002, at 1, 6, available at
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237

impossible, he argues.
Race cannot be determined biologically or
genetically. Appearance does not work either—some people who look
white consider themselves Black. One might also ask whether recent
immigrants from Africa or the Caribbean are “Black.” What race are
children born to Asian American and Black parents? Any answer to
these questions provokes disagreement.
Others have argued that extending constitutional protection to
groups as opposed to prohibiting certain general classifications is that
group protection will promote group separatism as opposed to
238
assimilation into the larger American culture. The argument goes that
separatism, in turn, will kindle identity politics, with different groups
competing for their share of political goodies rather than being
interested in policies that promote the broader good.
Notwithstanding the presence of borderline cases, the element of
subjectivity they entail, and the danger of group protection kindling
separatism, Fiss’s work has been influential. His influence can be seen
in the work of later scholars who have attempted to explain and justify
the rigorous rational basis cases without defining or defending a concept
of groups. For example, Cass Sunstein has argued that in the laws
challenged in these cases the government singled out certain classes of
people—gay men and lesbians, persons with mental disabilities, and
239
(perhaps) hippies—because of their status.
Particularly in Cleburne
and Romer, Sunstein argues:
[W]e can find a desire to isolate and seal off members of a
despised group whose characteristics are thought to be in some
sense contaminating or corrosive. In its most virulent forms, this
desire is rooted in a belief that members of the relevant group
240
are not fully human.
But Sunstein does not explore how to distinguish discrimination

http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art1.
237. See id.
238. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 82 (2000) [hereinafter
YOUNG, INCLUSION] (discussing how some object to group representation because “groupspecific political movements endanger democracy and make meaningful communication
impossible” by “divid[ing] and destroy[ing] public discussion, creating bickering and selfinterested enclaves with no orientation towards transformative deliberation or cooperation”).
239. Sunstein, supra note 43, at 62.
240. Id. at 62–63.
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based on status from discrimination based on conduct. How does the
Court know whether a law aims at people because of what they do
rather than because they are the type of person who would do such
things? He therefore does not resolve the question whether bans on
same-sex sodomy and general bans on sodomy, struck down by
Lawrence under rigorous rational basis scrutiny, are impermissible bans
242
on status or merely bans on conduct.
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have also argued that Romer,
243
244
Cleburne, and Plyler (and perhaps Moreno) might be best explained
245
by what they call the “pariah principle.”
This principle forbids the
government from “brand[ing]” a group “as inferior and encourag[ing]
246
Colorado’s Amendment 2, at issue in
others to ostracize them.”
247
Romer v. Evans, provides their main example.
Under that
Amendment, gay men and lesbians, unlike any other group of persons in
Colorado, were “permanently disbarred from seeking . . . protection”
248
against discrimination based on their sexual orientation.
Farber and
Sherry also read the Court’s prohibition on laws motivated by “a bare
. . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” as prohibiting
government from enacting laws that solely or primarily embody the
249
purpose “to brand [a group] as outcasts,”
which Colorado’s
Amendment 2 did. In short, the Constitution prohibits the state from
passing laws that create legal castes.
Farber and Sherry do not just assert the distinction between status
250
and conduct. They explain that Amendment 2 targeted status because
it applied to gay men and lesbians regardless whether any particular
251
individual was or ever had been sexually active. Similarly, the children
in Plyler were barred from school because of their status: they were not

241. See generally id.
242. Id.
243. Farber & Sherry, supra note 43, at 280, 284.
244. See id. at 276. Farber and Sherry quote from Moreno when describing the pariah
principle, but they do not argue that the food-stamp restriction reflects a desire to brand
hippies as pariahs. Id.
245. Id. at 284.
246. Id. at 267.
247. See id. at 270–71.
248. Id. at 278–79.
249. Id. at 276 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
250. See id. at 279.
251. Id.
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responsible for their status as illegal aliens, their parents were. And
though the City of Cleburne couched some of its arguments for
restricting the group home in terms of conduct (persons with mental
disabilities might have trouble evacuating the home in case of a flood),
others sounded in status (neighboring middle-schoolers might harass
residents because of their disabilities and property values would decline
253
in and around the group home).
Though the distinctions they draw in these cases appear sound, the
status–conduct distinction cannot provide a principle to justify the
rigorous rational basis cases. First, Lawrence protects conduct, full
254
stop. A person need not identify as gay or lesbian to have his or her
255
right to engage in same-sex sodomy protected. Farber and Sherry do
not discuss sodomy prohibitions, and this reason may be why.
Second, the status–conduct distinction is too slippery to be useful.
One may become addicted to drugs through conduct but addiction itself
would seem to be a status, one that compels you to take drugs. One
takes drugs and one is addicted, but divorcing the two is hard and may
not be useful for many purposes. Like the speech–conduct distinction
that cannot explain free speech doctrine, the status–conduct distinction
cannot be the basis for a workable constitutional principle. Most
troublingly, one’s moral view of a group and its conduct strongly
influences the classification. Even if a clear line could be drawn, the
status–conduct distinction is a pallid principle for rigorous rational basis
cases. For gay men and lesbians, the status–conduct distinction
withholds their “right to engage” in conduct that “express[es] . . . love
256
and thus . . . their sense of self.”
Apart from the status–conduct distinction, the pariah principle does
not explain the rigorous rational basis cases. Farber and Sherry candidly
admit that the pariah principle does not fully protect the rights of gay
257
men and lesbians. That principle would allow states to ban same-sex

252. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
253. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449 (1985).
254. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (incorporating into its holding
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986), overruled by
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
255. Id. at 578.
256. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 210, 253 (1989) [hereinafter KARST, BELONGING].
257. Farber & Sherry, supra note 43, at 280–81.
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marriage, restrict gay men and lesbians’ receipt of top secret security
clearances, and generally restrict their service in the military under
259
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”
Lower courts have held, however, that
rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s prohibition against laws based solely on
260
moral objections to gay men and lesbians cuts the other way.
More recently, Kenneth Karst has argued that the Court’s concern
about the subordination of minority groups animates most if not all of
261
the substantive due process cases.
Meyer v. Nebraska protected the
rights of German immigrants to pass on the German language to their
262
children. Pierce v. Society of Sisters protected the rights of Catholics, a
religious minority in Oregon, to educate their children consistent with
263
their religious beliefs. Loving v. Virginia recognized the fundamental
right to marriage to dismantle an essential legal pillar of racial
264
apartheid.
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe recognized the right to
contraception and abortion, providing women with the control over
265
their reproduction that is necessary to their equal citizenship.
Lawrence recognized the right of gay men and lesbians to have sex in
order to secure their equal right to pursue intimate relationships with
266
others.
Professor Karst’s essential insight is undeniable—that majorities
often restrict the liberties of minority groups in order to preserve the

258. Id. at 281–82.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st
Cir. 2012) (invalidating federal Defense of Marriage Act using rigorous rational basis
scrutiny); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2012) (invalidating a California
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage using rigorous rational basis scrutiny),
cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7,
2012); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (invalidating
Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriage using rigorous rational basis scrutiny).
261. Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 102 (2007).
262. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396, 403 (1923).
263. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532, 534–35 (1925).
264. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
265. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Connecticut’s law permitted men
but not women to use birth control—it expressly permitted the use of condoms to prevent
disease. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
266. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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power and dominant social position of majority group members. That
insight rings true in the context of the rigorous rational basis scrutiny, as
well. The Court has said in each of the rigorous rational basis cases that
it is protecting a minority group from being singled out for ill
268
treatment. Groups matter to the Supreme Court. They have mattered
in the past, and they will matter in the future. But this explanation for
rigorous rational basis does not explain how to identify a group for
purposes of constitutional protection. It therefore leaves unanswered an
essential step in this analysis.
Using the examples of Blacks, women, gay men, lesbians, and
persons with disabilities, Professor William Eskridge has described how
identity-based social movements have persuaded the Supreme Court
that the traits they possess are tolerable or benign variations from the
269
norm. The Court thus forbids majorities from using the traits to justify
laws that stigmatize those who possess it or laws that limit the civil rights
270
of such persons. Professor Eskridge, however, does not explain why
identity groups deserve more protection from state regulation of
morality than individuals whose identities are constituted by legally
271
forbidden conduct.
The shortfalls in these theories suggest that to understand rigorous
rational basis scrutiny, we must understand what groups are from the
perspective of that doctrine.
It is tempting to argue that “groups” share immutable characteristics
while members of disadvantaged classes do not, but some features that
intuitively seem to define groups are mutable—people change religious
affiliations and learn new languages, after all—and some features of
classes would be hard to change. For example, a liquor store owner
whose business will go under because of restrictions on Sunday sales
may have no easy way to shift to a new line of work.
The distinction between status and conduct also presents a
superficially appealing but ultimately inadequate justification for
rigorous rational basis scrutiny. For example, the Lawrence and Bowers
Courts’ divergent characterization of the same facts drove their
267. See KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 1–2.
268. See generally supra Part II.
269. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and
Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419, 467–68 (2001) [hereinafter Eskridge, Channeling].
270. See id. at 438.
271. See generally id.
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conclusions about whether those facts presented cognizable claims
272
under the Constitution. Under the Bowers Court’s view that sodomy
was a deviant act, Georgia’s decision to ban sodomy was similar to its
273
decision to ban the use of marijuana at home. Moral objections are a
perfectly sensible reason for such bans, as criminal laws often reflect
society’s moral disapproval of the proscribed acts more than they reflect
concerns about the harm to third parties. Under the Lawrence Court’s
view that gay men and lesbians had similar moral worth as
heterosexuals, to characterize the right at stake as the act of
274
“homosexual” sodomy insults and degrades gay men and lesbians.
Sexuality—for all of us—“can be but one element in a personal bond
275
that is more enduring.”
In this light, Texas’s law against same-sex
sodomy looks more like a desire to stigmatize gay men and lesbians as
deviant outsiders, akin to Cleburne’s requirement of a special use permit
for group homes for persons with mental disabilities and Plyler’s
276
restrictions on illegal immigrant children’s public school attendance.
In these cases, the Court held that the state restricted a group’s rights or
liberties because it disliked that group. Dislike does not sound rational.
It sounds mean.
This conclusion has some intuitive appeal, and it undergirds all of
the rigorous rational basis cases: hatred of a group of people hardly
qualifies as a “rational” reason, and laws that target groups seem more
suspicious than laws that target conduct because that conduct is deemed
277
objectionable.
If correct, then fashioning a principle for these cases
could be as simple as distinguishing between laws that target groups or
status and laws that merely target conduct.
As noted above, however, distinguishing regulations based on status
272. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566–67 (2003); see also Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 190, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
273. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192–94 (explaining that there is no “fundamental right” to
engage in “acts of consensual sodomy” because a ban on such acts is “deeply rooted” in
national history), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
274. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566–67.
275. Id. at 567.
276. Compare id. at 575, with City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 450 (1985) (describing the special permit requirement as an “irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded”), and Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (holding that the law at
issue works to isolate and deny “a discrete group of innocent children the free public
education that it offers to other children”).
277. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (describing the law being overturned as an “irrational
prejudice” and therefore unconstitutional).
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from those aimed at conduct is much harder than it sounds. Cass
Sunstein, for example, argued that Cleburne and Romer (and to a lesser
278
extent Moreno)
reflect sharp “we-they” distinctions and irrational hatred and
fear, directed at who they are as much as what they do. . . . It
would be hard to imagine a similar measure directed against
polygamists, adulterers, or fornicators. Polygamists, adulter[er]s,
and fornicators are punished through law or norms because of
279
what they do.
But both polygamists and fornicators have been punished both for
what they do and who they are. During the nineteenth century,
Mormon polygamists were vilified both for what they did (engage in
plural marriage) and for who they were—Mormons. Polygamy was
associated with heathen cultures—“almost exclusively” with “Asiatic
and . . . African people,” as the Court put it in Reynolds v. United
280
281
States. Western civilization had always considered it “odious.” Even
after the Mormon Church reversed its position on polygamy and
forbade it, Mormons have long continued to be regarded with
282
suspicion. Furthermore, both fornication and polygamy depend on a
person’s marital status. Only unmarried people can commit fornication,
and only married people can be polygamous. Both who a person is—
283
status—and what a person does—conduct—underlie these crimes.
278. Sunstein, supra note 43, at 62.
279. Id. (emphasis added).
280. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
281. Id.
282. Ross Douthat, Op-Ed., Divided by God, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2012, at SR1
(observing that “the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, is the ultimate outsider
church, persecuted at its inception and regarded with suspicion even now” and “Christian
theologians” even “wrangle over whether Mormon beliefs should be described as
Christianity”); Laurie Goodstein, Mormons’ Ad Campaign May Play Out on the ’12
Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, at A1 (reporting that an advertising agency hired
by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints discovered through “focus groups and
surveys . . . that Americans who had any opinion at all used adjectives that were downright
negative: ‘secretive,’ ‘cultish,’ ‘sexist,’ ‘controlling,’ ’pushy,’ ‘anti-gay’”); see also J. Spencer
Fluhman, Op-Ed., Why We Fear Mormons, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2012, at A25 (observing that
“[m]ockery of Mormonism comes easily for many Americans” and “many rank-and-file
evangelical Protestants call Mormonism a cult”).
283. The distinction between status and conduct is famously elusive, and I wonder
whether it is worth the candle. Judge Richard Posner argues forcefully that discrimination
against gay people boils down to status:

08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

3/6/2013 9:28 PM

LIFTING THE VEIL

423

This objection to Sunstein’s distinction (and to the status–conduct
distinction generally) is more generalizable. It can be difficult to
distinguish laws that are motivated by animus toward a group from laws
that are motivated by disapproval of some conduct. All criminal laws
stigmatize the prohibited conduct and, by extension, stigmatize the class
284
of people who do the prohibited act. That is Justice Scalia’s objection
to Romer: “I had thought that one could consider certain conduct
reprehensible . . . and could exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such

[I]f you (being male) say that you'd like to have sex with that nice-looking young
man but of course will not because you are law-abiding, afraid of AIDS, or
whatever, you will stand condemned in the minds of many as a disgusting faggot.
Homosexual acts are punished in an effort, however futile, to destroy the
inclination.
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 233 (1992). While Judge Posner must be correct
that many who claim to hate the sin but love the sinner are hypocrites, his argument requires
that all who so claim are. As a general matter, I am leery of arguments that are based on the
proposition of hypocrisy.
Janet Halley has argued persuasively that the distinction between status and conduct
simply collapsed under the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy when the military
drummed many gay people out of the service based on evidence of non-sexual acts that only
subtly suggested a person’s sexual orientation. She says that supporters of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” said it was “supposedly fairer” than the military’s outright ban on gay men and lesbians
“because it sanctions servicemembers not for ‘who they are’ but for ‘what they do.’” JANET
E. HALLEY, DON’T: A READER’S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY’S ANTI-GAY POLICY 1 (1999).
Professor Halley says that spin was, “Wrong, wrong, and wrong again.” Id. “Every moving
part of the new policy is designed to look like conduct regulation in order to hide the fact that
it turns decisively on status.” Id. at 2. Consequently, status protections for gay men and
lesbians without protections for same-sex sexual conduct provide no real protection from
sexual orientation discrimination.
The gay rights movement also has more ambitious aims: to eradicate the entire spectrum
of discrimination against gay men and lesbians and for gay men and lesbians to achieve equal
legal and social status for themselves and their intimate relationships. Bill Eskridge argues
that for gays and lesbians to become full-fledged members of our pluralistic democracy, they
will have to persuade other Americans that their same-sex sexual orientation is merely a
“benign variation from the [heterosexual] norm.” Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269, at
467. At this point in history, however, many Americans have accepted at most that gay
people are a “tolerable” variation from the norm. “Gay people ought not be imprisoned but
neither should the state promote homosexuality.” Id. at 468.
284. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws
that regulate sexual behavior reflect society’s belief “that certain forms of sexual behavior are
‘immoral and unacceptable’” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986),
overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)). Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I had thought that one could consider certain conduct
reprehensible—murder, . . . or polygamy, or cruelty to animals—and could exhibit even
‘animus’ toward such conduct.”).
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285

conduct.”
Justice Scalia’s premise is correct (though his illustrations are
286
invalid) —the point of moral objections is to stigmatize the persons
who engage in such conduct. The Court has had little problem finding
some other laws constitutional though nothing but morality justifies
287
them. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. is one such example.
Indiana
offered no justification for its ban on nude dancing besides its moral
distaste for the dancers who would like to appear nude in front of other
288
people and the patrons who frequent totally nude clubs. The point of
the public indecency statute was to discourage nude dancing by
stigmatizing as criminals nude exotic dancers and the individuals who
289
like to watch them. Polygamy laws are also grounded solely in moral
concerns—the belief that marriage between just two people is a better
form of relationship than plural marriage. Such laws stigmatize both
polygamy and polygamists. Similarly, laws that ban the sale of sex toys
demean or stigmatize the people who want to use them and the people
290
who want to sell them.
“Animus” alone cannot be the variable that triggers rational basis
scrutiny. Animus toward a group triggers it. Unfortunately, this
conclusion does not solve the puzzle of rigorous rational basis scrutiny.
Any class of people can also be referred to as a group—for example,
“the group of nude dancers,” “polygamists,” “the group of married
couples,” “ex-cons.” That the Court might strike down bans on public
nudity or distinctions between married and unmarried couples in the tax
code is pure fantasy. Moral disapproval of only some groups, therefore,
must be the trigger for heightened rational basis scrutiny. The Court,
285. Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
286. Justice Scalia unnecessarily undermines his own argument by providing an inapt
illustration that conflates acts that are prohibited for both moral reasons and their tangible
harms to third parties’ persons or property (murder and animal cruelty are two of his
examples) with acts that are prohibited solely for moral reasons (e.g., consensual same-sex
sodomy). Id.
287. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (holding Indiana’s public
indecency statute constitutional on the grounds that protecting morality is a “substantial
government interest”).
288. Id. at 567–68.
289. Id. at 571–72
290. Cf. Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to uphold the ban on the sale of sex toys
because, like Texas’s ban on sodomy, this ban stigmatizes and demeans the intimate conduct
of persons who use sex toys).
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however, has never provided criteria for determining which groups
merit this more rigorous form of rational basis scrutiny and which do
not.
In short, the Court’s rational basis scrutiny doctrine has granted
some groups some discrete rights. But it has denied them the reasons
for those rights that could protect them from future attempts to limit
291
other rights or privileges.
It has also denied to other minorities the
legal arguments necessary to persuade courts to shield them from
restrictions on their rights.
IV. THE COURT OUGHT TO PROTECT GROUPS WITH RIGOROUS
RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY.
For all the problems defining groups, one thing should be clear: It is
possible to define “groups” for some purposes.
Even though
classification cannot be done with perfect objectivity, it does not follow
that classification is either impossible—it is done all the time—or
292
pointless. “[G]roups are real,” even if it is hard to define them
precisely.
A. What Is a Group? The Concept of Structural Groups
To begin with, the concept of “group” is not utterly vacuous. Some
things about groups are clear. A group is more than the aggregation of
several individuals. Groups (and their members) are created and act in
relation to many different internal and external forces. These internal
and external forces can include group members themselves, people
outside the group, other groups, the law, and social norms (both the
group’s and outsiders’). Furthermore, the groups to which we belong
(and are perceived to belong) often affect our lives and opportunities, in
part because other people make implicit and explicit assumptions about
groups and their members. Sometimes, as well, the groups to which an
individual belongs (or is perceived to belong) shape and condition her
social and legal interactions and relationships with other people.
Even at this general level it is possible to draw distinctions among
291. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1178 (1989) (explaining that Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence suffers from a lack of
specifically enunciated rules, and therefore, does not provide much guidance in the way of
what does and does not constitute violation).
292. Iris Marion Young, Status Inequality and Social Groups, 2 ISSUES LEGAL
Scholarship, no. 1, art. 9, Aug. 2002, at 1, 5, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art9.
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groups that help determine when treating a collection of people as a
group is likely to advance certain constitutional goals. In some groups,
patterns of interactions restrain the relative freedom and depress the
material well-being of individual members. Iris Marion Young calls
293
these “structural groups” (after the concept of “structural inequality”).
More precisely, she defines such groups as “a collection of persons who
are similarly positioned in interactive and institutional relations that
condition their opportunities and life prospects” in mutually reinforcing
294
ways.
Interactions in one context “reinforce the rules and resources
available for other actions and interactions involving” other members of
295
the group. Consequently, groups that start with superior social status
and resources have an easier time staying on top, and groups with
296
inferior status have a harder time moving up the social hierarchy. That
297
is not so with Cubs fans.
Structural groups should not be confused with cultural groups, such
as ethnic or racial groups. Sometimes these groups overlap, but often
they do not. For example, Irish-Americans are a cultural group, as Saint
Patrick’s Day parades, corned beef and cabbage, and maudlin renditions
of Danny Boy attest. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
discrimination against Irish-Americans may have also made the group a
298
structural group, but no longer.
Cultural groups emerge when both
group members and outsiders perceive the group as meaningfully
distinct from society in general. This shared feeling of distinctiveness
arises from interactions between people who speak different languages
and have different practices and beliefs. These encounters intensify the
importance of shared attributes and solidify feelings of “mutual affinity
299
and self-consciousness of themselves as groups.”
293. Id. at 3 (explaining that “[s]tatus inequality” is inherent in a “structural situation
where a group of individuals” occupies a disadvantaged position).
294. YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 97.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See supra Part III.B.1.
298. See YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 81–120 (explaining at length that
structural groups tend to be those with an inherent “status inequality”).
299. Id. at 91. Young provides the example of how the indigenous people of New
Zealand came to think of themselves as Maori. Id. at 90. Before the British arrived, these
people “saw themselves as belonging to dozens or hundreds” of distinct groups. Id. Over
time, their encounters with the English people, who were quite different from them and who
viewed and treated them as similar to each other, “changed their perceptions of their
differences.” Id. The Maori were all more different from the English than they were from
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In contrast women, gay men and lesbians, and racial groups (as
distinguished from some ethnic or cultural groups) are structural groups
300
but not cultural groups.
These groups are bound together by their
shared “attempt[] to politicize and protest structural inequalities that
301
they perceive unfairly . . . oppress” them. Through this process, such
groups may certainly develop shared practices and identity, but the
shared experience of protest forged these feelings of affinity and created
302
shared practices, not the other way around.
People may belong to a structural group whether or not they selfidentify with it and its members. The existence of these groups is one of
many of the necessary “conditions under which we form our
identities . . . . We act in situation, in relation to the meanings, practices,
and structural conditions and their interaction into which we are
303
thrown.”
Kwame Anthony Appiah has said, “We make up selves
from a tool kit of options made available by our culture and society. We
do make choices, but we do not determine the options among which we
304
choose.”
Law frequently plays a central role in creating and sustaining
structural groups. It can make some groups legally superior or legally
inferior by, for example, making members of some groups ineligible for
citizenship or to vote or by restricting the rights of members of some
groups to make and enforce contracts. Law can also stigmatize a group
by criminalizing conduct that is common to or associated with a group.

each other. Id.
300. See id. at 92 (explaining that groups built on “gender, race, class, sexuality, and
ability” are best categorized at “structural”); cf. also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Diversity of
What?, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 237, 241–45 (Robert Post
& Michael Rogin eds., 1998) (discussing how racial and ethnic categories “Asian” and
“Hispanic” or “Latino” in particular apply to people who come from different cultural
backgrounds and who may feel little or no cultural affiliation with one another).
301. YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 92.
302. Cf. Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269, at 434 (arguing that “[l]aw's
entrenchment of sexual orientation as a totalizing social trait” forged a group among women
and men who “had little in common with” each other “except by operation of law and social
attitudes”). Much the same can be said about law’s treatment of persons with disabilities as
persons with physical disabilities, mental disabilities, and mental illnesses that have little in
common other than their experiences of segregation and stigmatization.
303. YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 101.
304. K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and
Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION
149, 155 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
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The effect of such criminal laws can sweep far beyond individual
lawbreakers and the prohibited action. They often stigmatize (and
effectively criminalize) the traits associated with the propensity to
commit the unlawful act.
The concept of structural groups avoids some of the problems
discussed above that beset other attempts to define groups. It is
consistent with the concept of structural groups for someone to deny
that she identifies with a group though others identify her as such.
Consequently, the concept skirts some of the boundary issues discussed
above because it explains when such groups exist rather than defining
the conditions under which an individual can be said to belong to such a
group.
The concept of structural groups could also explain the most
paradoxical aspect of the Court’s application of heightened rational
basis scrutiny—its refusal to protect the most discrete and insular
305
groups. As explained above, this practice has long stood at odds with
the leading normative justification for the Court’s authority to negate
duly enacted legislation—John Hart Ely’s elaboration of Chief Justice
306
Stone’s footnote in Carolene Products.
There, Ely argued that the
Court should not negative legislation merely because a majority of
307
justices believe it to be substantively unjust. Rather, the court should
“intervene[] only when the ‘market,’ in our case the political market, is
308
systemically malfunctioning.”
The substantive injustice of a law does not by itself signal a
malfunction. Ely argued that the political process itself must be
309
unworthy of trust as well.
Courts may negative duly enacted
legislation when “the ins are choking off the channels of political change
305. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 46, at 55. A similar argument could possibly
provide a general explanation for the court’s substantive due process and equal protection
jurisprudence, too. Professor Bill Eskridge’s articles on identity-based social movements
(IBSMs) make a very similar argument, though Iris Marion Young’s work generally and her
concept of structural groups in particular does not figure into his analysis. See generally
Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269; Eskridge, Effects, supra note 227. Such a general
explanation of the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, however, lies beyond the
scope of this article.
306. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
307. See ELY, supra note 216, at 101–02 (explaining that elected representatives are
better situated to support the “American system of representative democracy” than are lifetenured judges).
308. Id. at 102–03.
309. Id.
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to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out;” or “though no
one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out
of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of
interest” effectively denying the group protections that other groups
310
enjoy.
One could argue that neither of these conditions exists with respect
to gay men and lesbians because dozens of state legislatures and state
courts have overturned laws that criminalize sodomy and have
persuaded dozens of localities and several states to enact bans on sexual
orientation discrimination in employment and housing. Furthermore, as
Part III.B explained, the Court has also refused to protect groups that
311
meet one or both of Ely’s conditions. Under current doctrine, states
may significantly restrict the civil rights of felons and ban polygamous
marriages. The Romer Court declared that its reasoning did not change
these cases, though in 1996, neither of these groups had much if any
312
political power.
Members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS) have chosen to live in physically
remote and isolated places to try to fly under the radar of legal
313
authorities.
Former felons are among the most despised classes of
people and are politically powerless; though this may be changing as
felons have pressed for the restoration of their civil rights and have also
begun to organize around the issue of prison rape.
The Court’s reluctance to protect groups until they have achieved
some political success is not as paradoxical as it may first appear. Bill
Eskridge has argued persuasively that extending constitutional
protection to a discrete and insular group before it has amassed some
314
outside support could be counterproductive.
Echoing Alexander
Bickel’s passive virtues, Professor Eskridge argues that “a judiciary that
315
defies a national Kulturkampf risks institutional suicide” for the simple
reason that the judiciary has to count on the other branches and on the
310. Id. at 103.
311. See supra Part III.B.
312. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996).
313. Scott Anderson, The Polygamists, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. (Feb. 2010),
http://www.ngm.nationalgeographic.com/print/2010/02/polygamists/anderson-text.
314. See Eskridge, Effects, supra note, 227 at 2372 (“Any Supreme Court decision or
series of decisions viewed as challenging a national equilibrium in favor of a norm or against a
despised group will be subject to likely political discipline.”).
315. Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269, at 511.
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316

states to follow its decisions. Constitutional protection for groups that
are truly discrete and insular (that is, before a group has achieved some
legislative victories or persuaded a sizeable plurality that its trait is at
least, as Professor Eskridge puts it, “tolerable”) can backfire by
317
cementing the existing and negative norms about the group.
The
following sections argue why courts’ use of strict scrutiny is particularly
likely to trigger such backlash that can undo the rights that they have
declared, while courts’ careful use of rigorous rational basis scrutiny is
far less likely to do so.
B. Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny Is Not Too Little Protection Too
Late
The objection that rigorous rational basis scrutiny for structural
groups is too little protection that comes too late should be rejected.
True—the Court will only protect such groups when they have already
318
gained some political traction.
A structural group, however, needs

316. But see David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J.
723, 724, 732 (2009) (arguing that the Court banks rather than spends its institutional capital
when it invalidates the action of other branches or states and those institutions acquiesce to
the decision). David Law is surely right that when the Court wins, it increases its power. See
id. His argument should not be construed as one that the Court should issue decisions that
cut deep against prevailing norms. Id. at 779–80. (One of Professor Law’s examples is Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000)). It is not a case, however, in which the Court’s ruling cut
strongly against prevailing public opinion. Half the country was happy about the result and
everyone was relieved to have the issue settled.) It suggests, rather, that the Court has to pick
its battles carefully, as open defiance would certainly erode its power. See id. Furthermore,
public opinion polls show that public respect for the Court has been waning in the wake of
Bush v. Gore, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the health-care decision in
June 2012. See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44%
in Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1 (opining that the “decline in the [C]ourt’s standing
. . . could reflect a sense that the [C]ourt is more political, after the ideologically divided 5-to4 decisions in Bush v. Gore, which determined the 2000 presidential election, and Citizens
United” in 2010); Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Public's Opinion of Supreme Court Drops
After Health Care Law Decision, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A21 (reporting that a majority
of the public thought the personal or political biases of justices controlled the health-care law
decision, not legal analysis). These trends call Professor Law’s thesis into question.
317. See Eskridge, Effects, supra note 227, at 2372 (“Any Supreme Court decision or
series of decisions viewed as challenging a national equilibrium in favor of a norm or against a
despised group will be subject to likely political discipline.”).
318. See Eskridge, Effects, supra note 227, at 2371–72 (describing how “constitutional
protection” is “primarily a function of the political progress a minority group has made” and
if “socially despised and not politically organized, it will be subject to pervasive state
segregation into inferior spheres of the culture”).
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protection just at this point because it risks serious retribution—both
official and unofficial—when it is publicly protesting its legal treatment
and achieving some measure of success. To take the most extreme
examples, assassinations of highly visible group leaders like Martin
Luther King Jr. and Harvey Milk unmistakably communicate to group
members that effective, public protest of their subordinate status or
319
stigmatization will meet violent backlash. But lesser forms of abuse—
both physical and verbal—can discourage many individuals from
publicizing their group membership, which can make it harder for
groups to organize to protest their inequality and amass the political
resources necessary to mount successful legal campaigns. Still, rigorous
rational basis scrutiny could be too little protection—an embarrassingly
pallid response to the mayhem of assassination and physical violence.
But such scrutiny provides more effective protection than one might
conclude from a simple comparison to strict scrutiny. Rigorous rational
basis scrutiny requires a state to clear two hurdles before it can restrict
320
the rights of structural groups.
First, the state must prove that the
restricted activity causes some palpable harm to the property or persons
321
of third parties.
Second, the state must prove that the regulation is
322
Serious over- or undernarrowly tailored to prevent that harm.
inclusivity dooms a regulation by creating a presumption that
impermissible animus motivated the legislation. Such scrutiny forbids
majorities from legally enacting their (sometimes violent) rage and
outrage through further, legal restrictions on a group’s rights and
liberties.
The Court’s focus on close fit and its insistence on evidence that
regulations target problems of public policy prevent majorities from
overreacting to a group’s political successes, as Coloradoans apparently
did when gay men and lesbians secured antidiscrimination protections
from some localities. Furthermore, heightened scrutiny of purposeful

319. Cf. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 203 (asserting that laws that criminalize
sex with same-sex partners “reinforce” the “stigma” of being gay or lesbian, “giving
heterosexuals official ‘permissions-to-hate’ that encourage not only police harassment but all
manner of privately inflicted harm from insults to trashing to violence”).
320. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569, 572 (1991).
321. See id. at 569 (holding that the statute was constitutional on the sole grounds that
promoting “order and morality” to limit the social harm of public nudity furthers a
“substantial government interest”).
322. See id. at 572 (upholding Indiana law on basis that it was narrowly tailored and was
“modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the State’s purpose”).
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state attempts to disadvantage groups also sends a normative message to
those who are outraged by a group’s visibility and political success:
Regulations based on outrage are “irrational” animus. Simply put,
moral disapproval of certain groups is irrational.
Moral judgments need not be, and often are not, rational in the
sense of employing logic in the service of consequentialist reasoning, so
it might seem odd to condemn straightforward moral assertions as
irrational. But rigorous rational basis scrutiny does not apply to private
opinions or moral judgments, or even to moral judgments of groups such
as a religious denomination. It applies to public acts taken by the state.
In effect, rigorous rational basis scrutiny requires that state action be
minimally rational in the following sense. The state must consider the
effect the action will have on all members of a community. The state
may not justify its action solely by reference to the moral judgments of
any given subset of the public. The state must justify its action in terms
of public ends, defined as ends that take into account the social
323
consequences of the state action.
By putting consequences on the
table, rigorous rational basis scrutiny makes it coherent to talk about the
rationality of public acts.
Putting consequences on the table has important effects.
Heightened rational basis scrutiny forces majorities who would restrict
the rights of certain groups to consider and deliberate about the actual
harms that extending those rights pose, as well as the harms the
323. The Supreme Court put the point this way in Lawrence v. Texas:
[F]or centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as
immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of
right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted
as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the
course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us,
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to
enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law.
“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”
539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992)); cf. id. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting))); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st
Cir. 2012) (striking down DOMA as unconstitutional because Congress justified DOMA by
“encomia to heterosexual marriage” but offered no “increase[d] benefits to opposite-sex
couples” and no explanation of “how denying benefits to same-sex couples will reinforce
heterosexual marriage”).
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restrictions inflict on the affected group. In essence, then, heightened
rational basis requires states to recognize that membership in a
protected group does not affect an individual’s status as a citizen.
Kenneth Karst has written that the principle of equal citizenship
requires that “[e]ach individual is presumptively entitled to be treated
by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating
324
member.” The seemingly thin measure of constitutional protection—
the requirement that the community and state demonstrate that a
group’s conduct harms another’s person or property—forces others to
tolerate the groups’ existence and engage them in rational political
debate about the costs and benefits of laws that disadvantage the
325
group. In short, rigorous rational basis scrutiny means that in public
326
dealings, group members must be treated with respect.
C. Inverting Carolene Does Not Pervert the Constitution
That rigorous rational basis is effective medicine is, however, only
half of the argument. What justifies extending rigorous rational basis
protection to structural groups but not to minorities, like polygamists
and ex-cons—who are even more discrete and insular? Moreover,
group affiliations do not uniquely constitute identity or shape
relationships. Disapproval or prohibition of any activity or association
that constitutes personal identity can also inhibit the expression of
individual identity and connections with others. While valid objections,
several reasons still cut in favor of protecting the practices or traits of
structural groups rather than participation in other disfavored activities
that also constitute identity.
The first is evidentiary. Structural groups are forged through group
protest of their subordination. Individuals who publicly protest their
legal subordination risk ridicule, their personal safety, prosecution, and
retribution. Taking such risks demonstrates that members of structural
groups value certain rights and liberties highly and cannot tolerate the
restrictions imposed on them.

324. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 3.
325. Cf. Eskridge, Effects, supra note 227, at 2375–76 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
scrutiny of legislation that disadvantages identity groups has facilitated healthy political
pluralism and can be normatively justified on that basis).
326. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 207 (noting that tolerance of a group’s
difference “implies respect, especially in our public dealings, for the beliefs and behavior of
individual citizens who are different from ourselves”).
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Second, public protest also demonstrates that group members
believe that keeping their traits, activities, or relationships with others
private or secret is harmful or impossible. Participating in public protest
reveals a person’s group identity or affiliation. Sex toy users, nudists,
people who pay for sex and people who watch nude dancers, usually
keep their preferences and desires private (or visible only to others
engaged in the same behavior, such as fellow strip club patrons) rather
than avowing them publicly. The Fifth Circuit’s decision that the
Constitution prohibits bans on the sale of sex toys did not spark
327
jubilation.
The California Supreme Court’s decision that marriage
328
must be extended to partners of the same sex did.
The Eleventh
Circuit’s decision upholding Alabama’s ban on the sale of sex toys did
329
The
not provoke protest marches or speeches by sex-toy users.
330
California Supreme Court decision upholding Proposition 8 did. Sextoy users or fetishists may be perfectly happy to disclose their desires
only to their partners. The illicit nature of these sexual activities may
even be part of their allure. While an activity may constitute a
significant part of individual identity, it may not constitute an
individual’s public identity. When the state does not, as a practical
matter, enforce restrictions on such activities when they are performed
in private, a law’s formal illegality may not harm an individual’s identity,
self-concept, or relationships with other people generally.
Third, when groups organize to protest their unequal legal treatment
and status, often their demands boil down to a claim for full and equal
status as American citizens. In other words, group claims to equal status
and treatment are not claims to have separate institutions recognized;
they are instead claims to be included in the broader legal and social
community. Kenneth Karst has argued that Americans’ shared identity

327. Texas Ban on Sex Toy Sales Overturned, CBS NEWS (Sept. 15, 2010, 12:22 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-3829467 (describing relatively muted reaction from
opponents of the law after the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision).
328. Jesse McKinley & John Schwartz, California’s Ban on Gay Marriage is Struck
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/us/05
prop.html.
329. See Kim Chandler & Eric Velasco, Alabama Supreme Court Upholds Sex Toy Ban,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Sept. 12, 2009), http://www.al.com/birminghamnews/metro.ssf?/base/ne
ws/1252743369276790.xmlcoll=2 (failing to mention any protests to the Alabama Supreme
Court ruling).
330. See McKinley & Schwartz, supra note 328.
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331

as citizens provides “at least one common ground on which all our
subcultures can meet,” and “a community of meaning, . . . an identity,
332
that overarches” our different group associations and personas.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny, in sum, reflects the reality that
groups and their particular interests drive political debate and decision
making. This level of scrutiny recognizes that members of these groups
have distinctive interests in relation to the practice of certain politics
(rather than distinct in the abstract). The practical effect of rigorous
rational basis scrutiny is to insist that the state treat members of a group
333
as equal members of the polity.
Heightened rational basis’s strong
rationality requirement forces those state actors who would choose to
limit such a group’s rights and liberties to proceed cautiously and
carefully.
Indeed, rigorous rational basis scrutiny may be just the right level of
protection for a structural group to proceed in its political campaign for
acceptance. This next section will discuss Professor Daniel Kahan’s
work on the effectiveness of two types of policy reforms: shoves, which
initiate large policy shifts, but which are often undone by backlash; and
nudges, which initiate smaller policy shifts, but which can snowball into
334
much larger shifts in public opinion and public policy.
It is my
contention that rigorous rational basis scrutiny is analogous to a nudge,
while strict scrutiny is more like a shove.
D. Nudges May Move Public Opinion and Public Policy Further than
Shoves
Daniel Kahan has argued that legal reformers should proceed
cautiously and incrementally when public norms are not fully behind a
335
particular legal change.
Reformers should avoid abrupt, radical
reforms of the status quo (which Professor Kahan calls “shoves”)
336
because they can backfire. Instead, reformers who want to make big
337
changes should proceed incrementally (he calls these “nudges”).
Nudges often encourage further legal reforms that add up over time to

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 173.
Id.
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533–36, 538 (1973).
Kahan, supra note 44, at 608.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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338

large and lasting shifts in law and public opinion.
Professor Kahan’s main example of shoves that have backfired are
attempts by some states to broaden rape to include date rape by
eliminating the element of force or the “mistake of fact” defense to lack
339
of consent. These “reforms have little effect on juries, which continue
to treat verbal resistance [saying “no”] as equivocal evidence of
nonconsent, or on prosecutors, who remain reluctant to press charges
340
unless the victim physically resisted the man’s advances.”
The
reason—“genuine societal ambivalence about the ‘no sometimes means
341
yes’ norm.”
Consequently, jurors “balk[ed]” at convicting men who
342
failed “to take ‘no’ at face value.” Prosecutors, as a result, were less
likely to charge men of rape when they were accused of raping women
343
who did not physically resist.
The refusal of juries to convict, and prosecutors to prosecute date
rapists, persuades others that date rape is not morally condemnatory
because people are influenced by others’ opinions about morality.
Morality is dynamic—when a person sees “that a relatively large group
of like-situated persons are engaging in a certain form of behavior, she is
more likely to engage in that behavior, too; this increases the size of the
group, inducing even more individuals to engage in the behavior, and so
344
forth and so on.” Resistance to and defiance of law by legal officials,
in other words, create feedback loops in which the refusal to prosecute
and convict encourages others to refuse to prosecute and convict. The
lack of legal enforcement, in turn, fails to encourage compliance with
the new law. In the end, “the norm that the law is designed to
change”—here, that no means no—“will grow in strength,” making
345
future enforcement even less likely, and so on. Radical legal changes
that are opposed by officials and the public entrench existing norms
346
more deeply, making subsequent reform efforts even harder.
338. See id.
339. Id. at 607.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 623.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 615.
345. Id. at 610.
346. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–67 (1973), may be another example of a shove gone
awry. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, for example, has argued that the Court essentially
wrested the issue of abortion out of the hands of legislatures, many of which were liberalizing
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More incremental reforms—which Professor Kahan calls gentle
nudges—may seem like weak medicine, but they can trigger an opposite
kind of cascade effect that fundamentally changes the norms about some
347
activity or the group associated with it.
When all else is “equal,
individuals prefer to carry out their legal obligations,” such that the
legality or illegality of an activity modestly affects a person’s views of its
348
morality.
Consequently, legal officials will enforce laws with which
349
they disagree, so long as they do not disagree too strongly.
These
enforcement efforts make it more likely that other officials who
350
otherwise dislike the new law will also enforce and support it.
Furthermore, people are more likely to condemn some act that their
351
peers also condemn, and peer opinion exerts an even greater influence
352
on a person’s moral view of some act than its legal status.
Consequently, a modest nudge can snowball into even harsher moral
condemnation of an act, which in turn will encourage further legal
353
reforms to punish that act more harshly. Antismoking efforts of the

or considering liberalizing existing abortion laws. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1205 (1992). She writes, “Around that extraordinary
decision, a well-organized and vocal right-to-life movement rallied and succeeded, for a
considerable time, in turning the legislative tide” toward greater abortion restrictions. Id.
Interestingly, the pro-life movement has been most successful when it has worked for nudges
rather than shoves. As William Saletan describes it, the pro-life movement has shaped public
attitudes about whether fetuses are lives that merit legal protection. They started small,
pushing for legislation that permitted women to recover for injuries that caused the
miscarriage of a child, increased penalties for violent crimes that caused a miscarriage,
restrictions on public funding of abortion, restrictions on doctors and clinics receiving federal
funding from discussing abortion even when asked by their patients, parental notification
laws, and short waiting periods that purported to help women understand the risks and
implications of abortion more fully. See generally WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT:
HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WAR (2004). Individually, none of these
directly assaulted the right to get an abortion. Each, however, contributed either to the
perception that fetuses were alive—human lives—or to the acceptability of restrictions on
abortion more generally. By 2004, Congress passed a ban on some late-term abortions even
though other types of abortion posed greater health hazards to women. See id.
347. Kahan, supra note 44, at 608.
348. Id. at 612–13.
349. Id. at 613.
350. Id. at 612–13 (arguing that an official is more likely to enforce a law that she
personally finds disagreeable when other legal officials are enforcing that law).
351. Id. at 614.
352. Id.
353. See id. (explaining that a modest lean in favor of one position is “likely to end up
decidedly skewed toward that position as individuals learn how others feel and why”).
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last several decades show how successfully nudges can change norms. In
354
the 1960s, over 40% of Americans smoked. Smoking was considered
sexy and sophisticated, and people smoked everywhere—at work, in
restaurants, bars, movie theaters, in other people’s homes, and on
airplanes. People even smoked around children and while pregnant.
Nonsmokers owned ashtrays because their friends smoked. Today,
355
smoking is considered a dirty habit of poor and working-class people,
356
and only 20% of Americans smoke.
Ashtrays are rarer than
California condors, and no smoker would dream of lighting up in a
friend’s house, anyway. Smokers are pariahs in workplaces, in
government buildings, in restaurants, and increasingly in nearly all other
public accommodations including bars, hotel rooms, and outdoor public
357
Pediatricians forbid smoking around children. Woe to any
spaces.
pregnant woman who smokes in public.
Nudges—small, incremental changes—produced this reversal in
attitudes about and restrictions on smoking. Federal law first required
printed health warnings on cigarette packages in 1965 and banned
358
television and radio advertisements for cigarettes in 1971.
In 1984,
Congress strengthened these warnings and made them more specific—
warning of the danger that smoking during pregnancy posed to
developing fetuses, the increased risk of cancer, and the perils of
359
secondhand smoke. During the 1980s, knowledge about the danger of
secondhand smoke spurred restaurants to offer smoking and
354. Jason Koebler, Study: Smoking Laws Prevented 800,000 Lung Cancer Deaths, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/03/03/14/st
udy-smoking-laws-prevented-800000-lung-cancer-deaths?vwo=501cd.
355. Vital Signs: Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults Aged 18 Years—United
States, 2005–2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sep. 9, 2011),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6035a5.htm?s_cid=%20mm6035a5.htm_w
(explaining that smoking prevalence “generally decreased with increasing education and was
higher among adults living below the poverty level (28.9%) than among those at or above the
poverty level (18.3%)”).
356. See id. (pointing to survey data to support conclusion that 19.3% of Americans
smoke every day or some days).
357. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 101.123 (2009–2010) (restricting smoking in public places in
Wisconsin).
358. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89–92, § 4, 79 Stat.
282, 283 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006)); Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 6, 84 Stat. 87, 89 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1335 (2006)).
359. Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200,
2201–03 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006)).
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nonsmoking sections. A cascade of restrictions soon followed. The
360
federal government banned smoking on domestic flights in 1989, and
361
States passed laws
extended that ban to overseas flights in 2000.
banning smoking in restaurants and banning smoking in buildings—
pushing smokers out of doors to huddle around ashtrays. Hotels offered
non-smoking rooms, and many soon realized that non-smoking rooms
were cheaper to maintain. Now several states ban smoking in bars and
clubs, and some localities ban smoking within twenty-five to fifty feet of
362
entrances to public accommodations and buildings.
E. Rigorous Rational Basis Scrutiny Is a Nudge Not a Shove
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny is also a nudge not a shove, though it
operates somewhat differently than the smoking example. Over time,
gradually increasing restrictions on smoking reversed public attitudes
toward smoking by making smoking more costly to engage in. Rigorous
rational basis scrutiny, however, does not make some behavior more
costly. Instead it makes legal restrictions more costly by forcing
majorities to articulate public-regarding reasons for restricting the rights
or privileges of groups. Under rational basis scrutiny, “because” suffices
363
as a reason. Rigorous rational basis requires majorities to follow the
“because” with some reason other than the majority’s subjective
364
preferences.
Over time, forcing majorities to articulate reasons can
dramatically change public attitudes.
Calling rigorous rational basis scrutiny a nudge is in tension with my
earlier analysis about rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s strength—it has

360. Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-164, § 335, 103 Stat. 1069, 1098–99 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (2006)); see also Smoking Onboard Aircraft, 65 Fed. Reg.
36,772, 36,772 (June 9, 2000) (noting that the then-current rules against smoking onboard
aircraft were “based [on] Public Law 101-164, which was enacted in 1989”).
361. Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub.
L. No. 106-181, § 708(a), 114 Stat. 61, 159 (2000) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41706
(2006)).
362. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 101.123 (2009–2010) (restricting smoking in public places in
Wisconsin).
363. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (explaining
that as long as the legislation could possibly be categorized as a “rational” remedy to a
particular problem, then it survives constitutional muster under regular rational basis
scrutiny).
364. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that the Colorado
constitutional amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”).
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365

proven fatal whenever the Court has used it. Certainly, when it comes
to results, rigorous rational basis scrutiny is strong medicine. It is still
accurate to call it a nudge for two reasons. First, compared to
intermediate and strict scrutiny, rigorous rational basis scrutiny is a
nudge, and I will unpack how this is true in a moment. Furthermore, it
is accurate to describe it as a nudge because it forces subtle shifts in the
kinds of reasons that majorities can give for restrictions on groups.
Rigorous rational basis nudges proponents to justify restrictions in
terms of the tangible third-party consequences of the restricted acts and
366
thus in terms of the gains to the public more generally.
It does not
effectively declare restrictions completely off the table. Instead it
requires a restriction’s proponents to show that the restricted action
produces tangible negative consequences to third parties; if that is true,
then a restriction benefits the general public, and it would survive
367
scrutiny. Rigorous rational basis scrutiny could also be described as a
kind of gentle resistance that a legal restriction must overcome. The
resistance can be pushed aside, but it takes some weight to move it. To
satisfy the standard, majorities must articulate some reason for limiting
the liberties of some group besides the majority’s dislike of the group or
368
fears about the group.
In the absence of such reasons, rigorous
rational basis scrutiny strikes down a particular restriction, requiring
majorities to rethink their reasons for that restriction.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny avoids broad principles that would
call into question other types of restrictions. Strict scrutiny implies, and
intermediate scrutiny usually implies, that distinctions on the basis of
some classification are invalid or irrelevant. Rigorous rational basis
does not. It requires only that the reasons involve consequences to third
parties rather than be based on a belief that a group exists, and a
distaste for that fact. One reason the Court said it would not be

365. See Kahan, supra note 44, at 608.
366. See id. In this respect, rigorous rational basis scrutiny and smoking restrictions are
similar. Smoking used to be considered to be a personal choice or preference—you like to
smoke, but I don’t, and that’s ok, much as you might like a Chevy Camaro, but I prefer the
Volkswagen Karmann Ghia. Mounting evidence that smoking was not merely a personal
choice, but a behavior that endangered other, nonsmoking and non-consenting people
probably drove many of the smoking restrictions.
367. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (holding that the statute
was constitutional on the sole grounds that promoting “order and morality” to limit the social
harm of public nudity furthers a “substantial government interest”).
368. See id.
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applying intermediate or strict scrutiny to disability classifications in
Cleburne was that persons with disabilities were, in their view,
369
sometimes relevantly different from the able-bodied population.
Statutes that require states to give children with disabilities special
educational services, for example, ought to remain constitutional and
370
within the power of legislatures to grant.
In contrast, strict scrutiny’s presumption that race is irrelevant to
371
government decision making imperils all classifications on the basis of
369. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (asserting
that persons with mental disabilities are “different . . . in relevant respects, and the States'
interest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitimate one”).
370. Similarly, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court forbade Texas from ejecting undocumented
alien children from public schools because Texas could demonstrate no reason for doing so.
457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). But Plyler does not force states to treat undocumented aliens the
same in all respects as citizens and legal aliens. Id. at 225. Employers are generally
prohibited from hiring undocumented aliens in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (2006),
and many states deny them driver licenses, see, e.g., Heineman: State Will Defend Driver’s
License Policy, LINCOLN J. STAR (Dec. 3, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://journalstar.com/news/stateand-regional/govt-and-politics/heineman-state-will-defend-driver-s-license-policy/article_7e5d
d843-98e6-54d1-a875-75f441cff2d7.html (reporting on Nebraska’s policy of denying driver
licenses to “illegal immigrants”—a policy Governor Dave Heineman said he would defend
even after being threatened with a lawsuit by the ACLU).
371. For example, in Parents Involved in Comm. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007), Justice Stevens chastised Chief Justice Roberts for insisting that all racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny when only “a few recent opinions—none of which
even approached unanimity” support that rigid application of “strict scrutiny.” Id. at 799–800
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens emphasized that he has “long adhered to the view
that a decision to exclude a member of a minority because of his race is fundamentally
different from a decision to include a member of a minority for that reason.” Id. at 799 n.3.
Justice Breyer agreed that race-conscious efforts to integrate schools are not subject to strict
scrutiny under Court precedent. Id. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As he explained in
Parents, “A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority,” which is “accepted by every
branch of government and is rooted in the history of the Equal Protection Clause itself,”
instructs that “the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious
criteria to achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution does not compel
it.” Id. at 823, 828 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), Justice
Ginsburg (joined by Justices Souter and Breyer) rejected the application of strict scrutiny to
the University of Michigan’s affirmative action plan. Id. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg approvingly quoted Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor Wisdom. Id. at 302.
Judge Wisdom wrote:
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious. To avoid conflict with the
equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or
imposes a burden must not be based on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color
blind. But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.
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race, including government programs designed and intended to benefit
372
historically disadvantaged groups. (Indeed, justices who would uphold
affirmative action have reasoned that benign discrimination such as
affirmative action and school integration plans should be subjected to a
373
lower level of scrutiny).
Romer and Lawrence also demonstrate the subtlety of rigorous
374
rational basis’s nudge.
Romer prohibited Colorado only from
excluding gay men and lesbians from the regular democratic process;
that was because Colorado offered no plausible reason for this
375
restriction. For better or for worse, Romer did not require Colorado
to protect gay men and lesbians from any kind of private discrimination
376
After Romer, Colorado did
or many kinds of public discrimination.
not have to ban employment discrimination or housing discrimination or
377
provide insurance to the partners of gay or lesbian employees.
The
only thing Romer said Colorado could not do was keep gay men and
lesbians from using the regular political process to fight for these
378
political changes.
Lawrence nudged a little harder by declaring that gay men and
lesbians had a protected liberty interest of intimate, consensual sexual

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 372 F.2d
836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)). And of course, Justices Marshall and Brennan always contended
that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard for racial classifications designed to
remedy racial inequality. See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 (1990)
(holding that the proper constitutional inquiry for policies designed to increase racial
diversity was whether such policies substantially furthered important government interests).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003) (incorporating Justice Stevens’
dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 578); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–36 (1996) (reasoning that a “desire to harm a
politically unpopular group” or a desire to “make them unequal to everyone else” because of
“personal or religious objections to homosexuality” does not constitute a legitimate
governmental interest (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))); see
also Kahan, supra note 44, at 608.
375. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
376. See id. at 635–36 (not incorporating in its ruling that Colorado must adopt any
additional legislation or constitutional amendments to afford homosexuals greater
protections).
377. See id. at 629, 635–36.
378. See id. at 635 (reasoning that Amendment 2’s announcement that homosexuals
shall not be protected by law fails to meet the constitutional requirement that “a law must
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose”).
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conduct immune from state prosecution. But this declaration was not
revolutionary or particularly counter-majoritarian.
The attorney
general for the State of Texas did not even defend its anti-sodomy law in
argument before the Court—that task fell to the district attorney of
380
Harris County. Furthermore, the Lawrence opinion declared no new
381
fundamental liberty and carefully limited the protected liberty scope.
This liberty protected individuals from criminal prosecution for private,
consensual conduct between adults that causes no harm to the persons
382
or property of third parties. (This last proviso is a definitional aspect
of rigorous rational basis scrutiny: conduct that causes third-party harms
to property or persons is a reason for a prohibition apart from simple
dislike or fear of gay men and lesbians).
F. Recent Cases Illustrating the Subtlety of Rigorous Rational Basis’s
Nudge
The two recent circuit court decisions regarding same-sex
383
and Massachusetts v. United States
marriage—Perry v. Brown
384
Department of Health & Human Services —also exemplify rigorous
385
rational basis scrutiny’s nudge-like qualities. Let me begin with Perry
379. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (finding a right to engage in sexual conduct without
government intervention); see also Kahan, supra note 44, at 608 (explaining how “gentle
nudge[s]” can snowball into consensus thought).
380. See David Oshinsky, Strange Justice: The Story of Lawrence v. Texas, by Dale
Carpenter, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/books/review/thestory-of-lawrence-v-texas-by-dale-carpenter.html (revealing through a book review that the
man “[a]rguing for Texas was Chuck Rosenthal, the flamboyant, if woefully unprepared,
Harris County district attorney”).
381. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though there is discussion of
‘fundamental proposition[s],’ . . . nowhere does the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual
sodomy is a ‘fundamental right’ . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 565 (majority
opinion))).
382. See id. at 578.
383. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing the rational-basis
standard to be used as “not a toothless one” with footing in the realities of the legislation),
cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7,
2012).
384. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.
2012) (opining that the scrutiny applied in analyzing DOMA’s constitutionality should be
something more than the ordinary deference afforded in rational basis scrutiny).
385. William Eskridge agrees:
As the proverbial “least dangerous branch,” the federal judiciary (headed by the
Supreme Court) is unable, and usually unwilling, to strongly challenge entrenched

08 MCGOWAN (DO NOT DELETE)

444

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

3/6/2013 9:28 PM

[96:377

v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit decision that declared unconstitutional
California Proposition 8, which banned same-sex marriage in California
after the California Supreme Court had extended the right of marriage
386
to same-sex couples.
The Ninth Circuit opinion is notable for what it does not do. It does
387
not say that the Constitution protects the right to same-sex marriage.
It does not say that laws that restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples
388
violate the federal constitution.
It does not say that gay men and
389
lesbians are a protected class. It does not say that same-sex couples
390
are the same as straight couples for purposes relevant to marriage.
The Ninth Circuit instead emphasized how unique Proposition 8 was
among bans on same-sex marriage and, as a result, the narrowness of its
391
ruling.
Proposition 8 was unique among same-sex marriage
392
First, it “stripped
restrictions, the court explained, for two reasons.
same-sex couples of the right to have their committed relationships
recognized by the State with the designation of ‘marriage,’ which the
393
state constitution had previously guaranteed them.” Second, it did so
while leaving in place the other rights and responsibilities of domestic
partners in California, which “are identical to those of married
394
spouses.” By doing so, Proposition 8, like Colorado’s Amendment 2,
“‘carves out’ an ‘exception’ to California’s equal protection clause, by

inequalities in this country. Judges may be willing to nudge the country in the right
direction, but rarely do they give a hard shove until the balance of antiminority
prejudice and prominority sympathy has shifted toward the latter.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the Constitutional Politics of
Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 96 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordla
wreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/64-SLRO-93.pdf.
386. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096.
387. See id. at 1082 (declining to rule on whether same-sex couples possessed a
fundamental right to marriage under the federal constitution).
388. Id. (refusing to decide whether permitting opposite-sex couples to marry while
denying same-sex couples from marrying violates the Equal Protection Clause).
389. Id. at 1101 (“A classification ‘neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding
along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity.’”).
390. Cf. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Same-sex
couples are identical to opposite-sex couples in the characteristics relevant to the ability to
form successful marital unions.”).
391. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1064.
392. See id. at 1076.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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removing equal access to marriage, which gay men and lesbians had
395
previously enjoyed, from the scope of that constitutional guarantee.”
The Ninth Circuit thus framed the question narrowly: could a
majority withdraw “a privilege or protection . . . from a class of
disfavored individuals, even if that right may not have been required by
396
the Constitution in the first place”? The answer to that question was
no, as Proposition 8’s defenders had produced no evidence that same397
sex marriage undermined the institution of marriage.
The Ninth
Circuit observed that rational basis is “deferential” but not
398
“toothless.”
“[E]ven the standard of rationality . . . must find some
399
footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.”
The Ninth Circuit’s grounds for why Proposition 8 failed rigorous
rational basis scrutiny were also narrow. Proposition 8’s proponents
argued that Proposition 8 “advances California’s interest in responsible
400
procreation and childrearing.”
The Ninth Circuit steered clear of
branding the position that opposite-sex couples make better parents
401
“We
than same-sex parents as irrational, meritless, or unsupported.
need not decide whether there is any merit to the sociological premise of
Proponents’ first argument—that families headed by two biological
402
parents are the best environments in which to raise children . . . .”
Instead, the court observed,
Proposition 8 in no way modified the state’s laws governing

395. Id. at 1081.
396. Id. at 1085.
397. Proposition 8’s proponents produced no evidence at trial that same-sex marriage
undermined the institution of marriage. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921,
949 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that an expert for Proposition 8’s proponents testified that
“recognizing same-sex marriage will lead to the deinstitutionalization of marriage” but cited
no evidence and gave no reasons for this conclusion). The only evidence at trial suggested
that same-sex marriage did not affect marriage or divorce rates. Id. at 972 (citing testimony
from plaintiffs’ expert witness that “[d]ata from Massachusetts on the ‘annual rates for
marriage and for divorce’ for ‘the four years prior to same-sex marriage being legal and the
four years after’ show ‘that the rates of marriage and divorce are no different after [same-sex]
marriage was permitted than they were before’” (second alteration in original)).
398. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
399. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)).
400. Id. at 1086.
401. It appears that the Proposition’s defenders presented little evidence on this point.
See Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. at 944, 948–49 (explaining that the expert witness’s
conclusions were “unsupported by evidence” and therefore were rejected).
402. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1086.
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parentage, which are distinct from its laws governing marriage.
. . . In order to be rationally related to the purpose of funneling
more childrearing into families led by two biological parents,
Proposition 8 would have had to modify these laws in some way.
403
It did not do so.
On this point, the court could rely on what Proposition 8’s
proponents had written for the official voter guide’s explanation of
Proposition 8: “Proposition 8 doesn’t take away any rights or benefits of
gay or lesbian domestic partnerships. Under California law, ‘domestic
partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits’ as married
spouses. (Family Code § 297.5.) There are NO exceptions. Proposition
404
8 WILL NOT change this.”
The court’s decision rested on the uniqueness of California law and
Proposition 8. It is not that gay men and lesbians have a right to samesex marriage. Rather, California law had given them the right to marry,
and Proposition 8 took it away. Under Romer, the Court emphasized:
[I]t is no justification for taking something away to say that there
was no need to provide it in the first place; instead, there must be
some legitimate reason for the act of taking it away, a reason that
overcomes the “inevitable inference that the disadvantage
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
405
affected.”
Here the court relies on common sense: people feel losses more
406
Not landing a job may feel bad, but
keenly than foregone gains.

403. Id. at 1086–87.
404. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 56 (2008), available at
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/argu-rebut/pdf/prop8-a-and-r.pdf. According to the
California Department of State website, arguments for and against ballot measures are
written by the measure’s proponents and opponents. See Official Voter Information Guide:
About Ballot Arguments, CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE (last visited Dec. 9, 2012),
http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/voter-info/about-ballot-arguments.htm.
405. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)).
406. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 306 (2011) (describing
studies that demonstrate that people judge losses based on reference points, such that the
“existing wage, price, or rent sets a reference point, which has the nature of an entitlement
that must not be infringed”); id. at 304 (“If you are set to look for it, the asymmetric intensity
of the motives to avoid losses and to achieve gains shows up almost everywhere.”); Henry J.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1296 (1975) (“And whatever the
mathematics, there is a human difference between losing what one has and not getting what
one wants.”).
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getting laid off or fired feels worse.
Furthermore, even after Proposition 8, California law guaranteed
gay men and lesbians who were registered domestic partners all of the
407
same rights and obligations as married couples.
The only work
Proposition 8 did was to deny the name of marriage to these same-sex
408
relationships that were in all substantive respects “marriage.” As the
Ninth Circuit put it, “[o]nly the designation of ‘marriage’ is withdrawn
409
and only from one group of individuals.”
The logic of rigorous rational basis and these unique facts make
410
Perry a clear but quite limited holding, and thus a nudge.
Perry
announces no broad principles that could extend its reach to other
411
cases.
The Court’s reasoning, based on rigorous rational basis
scrutiny, does not imply, as arguments based on strict scrutiny would,
412
Nor does
that same-sex couples are the same as straight couples.
Perry imply that no reasons exist for distinguishing same-sex couples
413
from their opposite-sex counterparts.
Rather, Perry’s point is that
414
these defendants failed to prove such a case. At trial, Proposition 8’s
415
proponents called only a couple of witnesses. The expert produced by
the proponents testified that it was his opinion that same-sex marriage
would undermine the institution of marriage more generally, but he
produced no evidence to support this opinion and did not engage
416
plaintiff’s evidence to the contrary.
Perry’s reach is limited in one other respect. It will only affect
California, and in the four years since voters passed Proposition 8,
Californians’ views have swung in favor of same-sex marriage. A 2012
407. The Ninth Circuit wrote, “Proposition 8 in no way alters the state laws that govern
childrearing and procreation.” Perry, 671 F.3d at 1088. It reasoned, “As before Proposition
8, those laws apply in the same way to same-sex couples in domestic partnerships and to
married couples. Only the designation of ‘marriage’ is withdrawn and only from one group of
individuals.” Id.
408. See id.
409. Id.
410. See id. at 1096.
411. Id.
412. See id. at 1082 (declining to consider whether same-sex couples have a fundamental
right to marry).
413. Id.
414. See id. at 1096 (holding that California failed to offer a legitimate reason for
Proposition 8).
415. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 944 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
416. Id. at 949.
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Field Poll estimates that 59% of California voters now favor permitting
same-sex partners to marry on the same terms as straight couples, with
417
only 34% against.
However, once Perry is finally resolved, gay men
and lesbians in California will soon have the same right to marry as
418
opposite-sex couples.
The First Circuit’s declaration that the federal Defense of Marriage
Act violated the Equal Protection Clause can also be described as a
419
nudge. Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health & Human
Services, like Perry, takes a conservative, minimalist approach in ruling
unconstitutional federal DOMA’s exclusion of valid same-sex marriages
420
from the federal definition of marriage.
That provision prohibits
same-sex married couples from filing joint tax returns, denies same-sex
surviving spouses social security benefits, and denies federal workers
421
dependent medical care benefits for their same-sex spouses.
422
(DOMA’s other provision, which “absolves states from recognizing
same-sex marriages solemnized in other states” was not at issue in the
423
case. )
The First Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, applied rigorous rational
basis scrutiny and required “that the federal government interest in”
424
enacting DOMA “be shown with special clarity.”
The First Circuit,
like the Ninth Circuit, also steered clear of broad principles that would
commit it to results in future cases. It explicitly sidestepped declaring
that gay men and lesbians are a suspect class, reasoning that there is no
425
precedent for it to do so. Romer, it says, would have been the natural
place for the Court to declare gay men and lesbians a suspect class, and

417. Press Release, Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, The Field Poll, Big Increase in
California Voters Who Favor Allowing Same-Sex Marriage: Six in Ten (59%) Now Approve
(Feb. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Field Poll], available at http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers
/Rls2406.pdf.
418. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1096 (holding Proposition 8 to be unconstitutional).
419. See Kahan, supra note 44, at 608 (explaining how “gentle nudge[s]” can snowball
into consensus thought).
420. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st
Cir. 2012) (explaining that it is not necessary to develop a new “suspect classification” for
homosexuals).
421. Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 6;
422. Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
423. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 6.
424. Id. at 10.
425. Id. at 9.
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Romer “conspicuously” did not.
Earlier First Circuit precedent has
427
also held that gay men and lesbians are not a suspect class. (In a slip
that reveals the First Circuit’s conservatism, the First Circuit refers to
428
sexual orientation as “sexual preference.” )
The court’s concern about a 1972 Supreme Court precedent, Baker
429
v. Nelson, also demonstrates how conservative a nudge this decision is.
In Baker, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed an equal protection
430
challenge to Minnesota’s refusal to marry same-sex partners.
In the
First Circuit’s view, Baker’s summary dismissal foreclosed certain bases
431
for the First Circuit decision. Baker prevented it from declaring gay
men and lesbians to be a “suspect” class, because suspect status would
432
call into question all state bans on same-sex marriage. Baker also kept
the First Circuit from declaring that same-sex partners have any federal
constitutional right to marry.
The First Circuit’s avoidance of heightened scrutiny is particularly
noteworthy because the Justice Department had refused to defend
DOMA and had urged the court to apply heightened scrutiny to find
433
DOMA unconstitutional. The Justice Department’s position certainly
gave the First Circuit political cover to write a broader opinion than it
ultimately did. (That there was any controversy at all was due to the
fact that the First Circuit permitted some members of Congress to
434
intervene to defend DOMA. ) The court’s refusal to step into a

426. Id.
427. Id. (citing to Cook v. Gates 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008)) (reasoning that Cook
“has already declined to create a major new category of ‘suspect classification’ for statutes
distinguishing based on sexual preference”).
428. Id.
429. See Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972) (summarily dismissing equal
protection appeal for “want of substantial federal question”); Kahan, supra note 44, at 608
(explaining how “gentle nudge[s]” can snowball into consensus thought).
430. See Baker, 409 U.S. at 810; see also Kahan, supra note 44, at 608 (explaining how
“gentle nudge[s]” may sometimes snowball into consensus thought if institutional actors don’t
perceive it as a threat).
431. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8 (“Baker does not resolve our own case but it does limit
the arguments to ones that do not presume or rest on a constitutional right to same-sex
marriage.”); see also id. at 9 (reasoning that “to create such a new suspect classification for
same-sex relationships would have far-reaching implications—in particular, by implying an
overruling of Baker, which we are neither empowered to do nor willing to predict”).
432. Id. at 9–10.
433. Id. at 7.
434. Id.
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political dispute between some members of Congress and the Executive
Branch shows the court’s desire not to get out ahead of public opinion.
In the end, DOMA still failed the weaker standard of rigorous
rational basis scrutiny. According to the First Circuit, the rigorous
rational basis line of cases discussed in Part II required it to
“undertake[] a more careful assessment of the justifications than the
435
light scrutiny offered by conventional rational basis review.”
436
Members of Congress justified DOMA on three grounds: first,
“preserving scarce government resources”; second, “defending and
nurturing the institution of traditional, heterosexual marriage”; and
437
third, “defending traditional notions of morality.”
None of these
reasons satisfied rigorous rational basis scrutiny.
Cost savings could not justify DOMA. While Congress may have
believed that DOMA would save the government money, the First
Circuit held that “detailed recent analysis indicates that DOMA is more
438
likely on a net basis to cost the government money.” Under regular
rational basis, the actual facts would not matter—Congress’s assertion
that DOMA would save it money supported by logical reasoning would
be just fine. Rigorous rational basis scrutiny required Congress to get its
math right. The actual facts on the ground contradicted Congress’s
439
reasoning and undermined DOMA.
Nor could “defending and nurturing the institution of traditional,
440
heterosexual marriage” justify DOMA. The First Circuit handled its
rejection of this reason gently. Congress, according to the court, failed
to produce evidence to support the “connection between DOMA’s
treatment of same-sex couples and its asserted goal of strengthening the
441
bonds and benefits to society of heterosexual marriage.”
The First
Circuit might have said that the connection between the two was
irrational or implausible. But like the Ninth, it avoided hyperbole and
442
stuck to stating mildly that DOMA’s defenders had not shown a link.
435. Id. at 11.
436. There was a possible fourth—protecting state sovereignty—but the First Circuit
held that it only served as a justification for DOMA’s other section. State sovereignty would
in fact cut in favor of federal recognition of valid state marriages. See id. at 14.
437. Id. at 14.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. at 14–15.
441. Id. at 15.
442. Id.
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In rejecting the third reason, the court simply said that rigorous
rational basis scrutiny rules out moral objections toward gay men and
443
lesbians as a justification for DOMA and cited Lawrence and Romer.
Once more revealing the mild nudge of rigorous rational basis scrutiny,
the First Circuit took pains to avoid besmirching DOMA’s proponents.
“In reaching our judgment, we do not rely upon the charge that
DOMA’s hidden but dominant purpose was hostility to
444
homosexuality.” Wanting to preserve the institution of marriage in its
traditional form “is not the same as ‘mere moral disapproval of an
445
excluded group,’” so DOMA’s proponents are not necessarily bigots
or hostile to gay men and lesbians. “Traditions are the glue that holds
society together, and many of our own traditions rest largely on belief
446
and familiarity—not on benefits firmly provable in court.”
Nevertheless, however sincerely and benignly held, moral preferences
do not satisfy rigorous rational basis scrutiny.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny’s gentleness is its strength because it
can change policies while running a lower risk of backlash than strict
scrutiny. Two other decisions that used strict scrutiny to declare
unconstitutional bans on same-sex marriage show how backlash can
undo strong constitutional protections.
G. Strict Scrutiny Is a Shove That Can Provoke Backlash That Negates
Constitutional Protection
The virtues of nudges also can be perceived by contrasting decisions
that nudge with those that shove. Strict scrutiny often leads courts to
issue opinions that signal, in substance and possibly in form, that certain
types of decisions are simply beyond the power of even overwhelming
majorities. Such decisions can lead members of such majorities to feel
that they have been excluded from the democratic process even though,
being in the majority, they hold what usually is the trump card for that
process. That sense of exclusion is different from the exclusion felt by
members of groups who receive no protection from majorities
whatsoever, but it can prompt the same desire to find a way to reclaim a
seat at the policy table.
Let us first consider the Hawaii Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in
443.
444.
445.
446.

Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003)).
Id.
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Baehr v. Lewin, which held that Hawaii’s ban on same-sex marriage
447
likely violated the state’s equal protection clause.
The Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the restriction on same-sex marriage was sex
448
discrimination. Under the Hawaii constitution sex discrimination was
subject to strict scrutiny, so the state had to justify its ban on same-sex
449
marriage under that stringent standard.
The Hawaii Supreme Court
450
indicated that the State’s arguments would likely fail that standard.
Without ruling on the merits, the Court deemed the State’s argument—
that it was preserving the traditional nature of marriage—“circular and
451
unpersuasive.”
In the Court’s view, the State’s reasoning resembled
452
that which the Supreme Court had rejected in Loving v. Virginia. As
the Hawaii Supreme Court presaged, the trial court that heard Baehr on
453
remand ruled in 1996 that the State had failed to satisfy strict scrutiny.
454
The Hawaii Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Thus, Hawaii’s ban
on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional.
But the Hawaii courts were not the last word on the matter by a long
455
shot. The Baehr decision sent shockwaves throughout the country. In
1996, conservatives began a “campaign[] across the nation to insure that
the recognition of same-sex marriages would not spread to other
456
states.” “So great was aversion to the . . . Hawaii ruling that Congress
passed—and President Clinton signed—the Defense of Marriage Act”
in 1996 “granting states the right to refuse to recognize same-sex

447. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (holding that its decision is in complete
harmony with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and that, on remand, the statute must
survive the strict scrutiny standard of proving both a “compelling state interest[]” and that the
statute is “narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgements of constitutional rights”).
448. Id. at 64 (finding that the statute, “on its face and as applied, regulates access to the
marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits on the basis of the applicants' sex”).
449. Id. at 68.
450. See id. at 67 (explaining that the statute is presumed to be unconstitutional unless
Hawaii can overcome the high hurdle of showing that the statute is justified by “compelling
state interests” and is “narrowly drawn” to avoid infringing on constitutional rights).
451. Id. at 61.
452. Id. at 63.
453. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996).
454. Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
455. Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality Litigation,
Then and Now, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (2009).
456. Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, N.Y. TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/same_sex_marriage/index.html
(last updated Nov. 13, 2012).
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457

marriages from other states.”
In Hawaii, voters overwhelmingly
458
approved of a constitutional amendment permitting the legislature to
459
460
ban same-sex marriage. Other states followed suit. In 1996 and 1997
alone, twenty-five states passed legislation defining marriage as a
461
relationship between a man and a woman. “By the time the Baehr v.
Lewin litigation came to an end in 1998, thirty-one states had enacted
462
laws to prevent the recognition of same-sex marriages.” To be sure,
few supposed that same-sex marriage had been permissible in these
states or recognized by the federal government before the flurry of
state-level DOMAs. Yet, the stamp of disapproval sent by strong
majorities at the state and federal levels created a firm baseline against
same-sex marriage.
The 2008 California Supreme Court decision that gay men and
lesbians had a constitutional right to same-sex marriage appears to have
463
provoked backlash that undid its work almost immediately. Like the
Hawaii courts, the California Supreme Court also applied strict scrutiny,
but for different reasons. It ruled that gay men and lesbians were a
464
suspect classification.
Sexual orientation was a suspect category
because it is “associated with a stigma of inferiority and second class
citizenship, manifested by the group’s history of legal and social
465
disabilities”; “sexual orientation is a characteristic . . . that bears no

457. Miranda Ewell, Gay-Marriage Ruling Ups the Ante, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 5, 1996, at 27A.
458. See 1998 General Elections Precinct Report, STATE OF HAWAII, 4 (Nov. 3, 1998),
http://hawaii.gov/elections/results/1998/general/98swgen.htm (reporting results of 69.2% in
favor, 28.6% against).
459. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage
to opposite-sex couples.”).
460. See State Policies on Same-Sex Marriage, THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB.
LIFE (Jul. 9, 2009), http://www.pewforum.org/Gay-Marriage-and-Homosexuality/StatePolicies-on-Same-Sex-Marriage.aspx (showing increase in states with constitutional
amendments banning gay marriage from 1998–2008).
461. Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. Lewin and the Long Road to
Marriage Equality, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 704, 725 n.163 (2011).
462. Id. at 725 n.163, 726 (listing states that had adopted state bans on same-sex
marriage).
463. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; see also In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal.
2008) (holding that limiting marriage to “between a man and a woman” is unconstitutional),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
464. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401.
465. Id. at 442.
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relation to a person’s ability to perform or contribute to society”; and,
though the court hesitated to deem it immutable, it was sufficiently
fundamental to a person’s identity that one should not be required to
467
disavow it.
Additionally, the California Supreme Court also held that
California’s domestic partnership statute violated same-sex couples’
468
fundamental right to marry. Though same-sex domestic partners had
all of the same substantive rights of married couples, the court held,
[A]ffording same-sex couples access only to the separate
institution of domestic partnership, and denying such couples
access to the established institution of marriage, . . . imping[es]
upon the right of those couples to have their family relationship
accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the family
469
relationship of opposite-sex couples.
Notice how powerfully the California Supreme Court declares the
rights of gay men and lesbians to marry. First, discrimination against
gay men and lesbians is tantamount to discrimination on the basis of
race, sex (which under California law also received strict scrutiny),
religion, or national origin. Sexual orientation is an irrelevant basis for
470
Second, gay men and
legislation save extraordinary circumstances.
471
lesbians had a fundamental right to marry in California.
Consequently, restrictions on the basis of sexual orientation or on the
472
right to marry would have to satisfy strict scrutiny.
This right to marry was very broad indeed. The California law that
the Court declared unconstitutional had actually given same-sex
relationships all of the same substantive rights and obligations as
473
marriage.
The domestic partnership statutes declared that every
provision of the California Code that referred to marriage was to be

466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 446 (holding that “the relevant statutes significantly impinge upon the
fundamental interests of same-sex couples”).
469. Id. at 445.
470. Id. at 442–43.
471. Id. at 446; see supra text accompanying notes 468.
472. See id. at 401.
473. California made domestic partner rights equivalent to marriage beginning January
1, 2005, with the enactment of CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004).
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read as referring to domestic partners. That was not good enough to
satisfy strict scrutiny.
If this domestic partnership law could not survive strict scrutiny, no
differentiation between same-sex and opposite-sex partnerships could.
Calling same-sex relationships “domestic partnership[s]” rather than
marriage denied same-sex couples’ fundamental rights because some
name other than “marriage” “cast[s] doubt on” the equal dignity of
475
same-sex couples and their families.
Denying same-sex couples
“access to the familiar and highly favored designation of marriage”
implied “an official view that their committed relationships are of lesser
476
stature than the comparable relationships of opposite-sex couples,”
when the law demands that they be treated with equal dignity. Calling
same-sex partnerships by a different, unfamiliar name denied same-sex
couples the “assurance” that married couples enjoyed “that the
government will enforce the mutual obligations between the partners
(and to their children) that are an important aspect of the commitments
477
upon which the relationship rests.”
The breadth of the California Supreme Court’s holding apparently
frightened some California voters. Immediately in the wake of the
decision, polls suggested that a bare majority of the public supported
same-sex marriage—51% of Californians approved same-sex marriage,
478
42% opposed it, and 7% were undecided. But by November 2008, the
California Supreme Court decision seemed to have turned undecided
Californians against same-sex marriage, along with some voters who had
479
previously said they favored same-sex marriage.
The breadth and
strength of the California Supreme Court’s decision let Proposition 8’s
supporters argue that the court had made a personal moral issue—
beliefs about the acceptability of same-sex marriage—into a legal
480
issue.
The amendment’s supporters argued that the California
Supreme Court’s decision would require schools to teach children that
same-sex marriage and gay or lesbian families were no different than

474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

Id. § 297.5(e).
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 400–01.
Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 427.
Field Poll, supra note 417, at tbl.1.
See id. at tbl.3.
See Eskridge, supra note 385, at 93.
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481

traditional marriage and families. Behind the hyperbole lay a grain of
truth. The California Supreme Court had left no doubt that the state
must treat these relationships exactly the same. Others worried that
churches, as public accommodations, would have to accept gay men and
lesbians as members and perhaps even perform same-sex marriage
482
ceremonies.
Ultimately, 52% of voters voted to ban same-sex
483
marriage.
Contrast In re Marriage Cases and Baehr with the much narrower
holdings of Perry and Massachusetts. Neither Perry nor Massachusetts
said that sexual orientation was a suspect classification, or that gay men
484
and lesbians had a fundamental right to marry.
Instead, both courts
said that the government had not shown that the legal restrictions on
gay men and lesbians had a rational relationship to some legitimate
485
interest apart from morality.
Consequently, the government had to
revisit the issue to try to articulate some reason besides moral
disapproval of same-sex marriages.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny leaves majorities some breathing
room to reconsider their desire to discriminate against a group.
486
Consequently it is less likely to produce backlash than strict scrutiny.
In re Marriage Cases and Baehr left no doubt that in California and
Hawaii any majoritarian attempts to treat gay men and lesbians
differently than heterosexuals were completely off the table. Drastic
measures—constitutional bans against same-sex marriage—were the
only option. Perry and Massachusetts appear to have sparked no
backlash.
That breathing room may make it possible for majorities to change
481. Id.
482. See Neil J. Young, Equal Rights, Gay Rights and the Mormon Church, N.Y. TIMES
CAMPAIGN STOPS BLOG (Jun. 13, 2012, 11:05 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2
012/06/13/equal-rights-gay-rights-and-the-mormon-church/.
483. Tamara Audi et al., California Set to Join Trend of Banning Gay Marriage, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 6, 2008, at A10.
484. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1082 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9416 (Dec. 7, 2012); see also
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012).
485. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 15; Perry, 671 F.3d at 1092–93.
486. It would be ludicrous to claim that the average, lay voter differentiates between
“strict scrutiny” and “rigorous rational basis” scrutiny. Do not mistake me as making that
claim. Instead, I am making a more modest one—that voters can tell the difference between
a very broad declaration of rights and more modest push back from courts to reconsider the
reasons for legislation.
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their minds about the equality of previously subordinated groups.
Interestingly, once a majority of Californians had voted to ban same-sex
marriage, they appeared to be able to reconsider the issue. Not quite
four years after Proposition 8 passed, 59% of Californians now support
487
same-sex marriage, more than in 2008.
Importantly, only 34% are
488
This polling data was gathered after
against it, with 7% undecided.
Perry, which supports the idea that rigorous rational basis ruffles fewer
feathers.
Perry and Massachusetts show how rigorous rational basis scrutiny
operates as a nudge, particularly as compared to more heavy-handed
489
intermediate or strict scrutiny analysis. As these cases show, rigorous
rational basis scrutiny requires majorities to articulate public-regarding
reasons for restrictions on groups. Under rational basis scrutiny,
490
“because” suffices as a reason.
Rigorous rational basis requires
majorities to follow the “because” with some reason other than the
majority’s subjective preferences. Over time, forcing majorities to
articulate reasons can dramatically change public attitudes.
H. Conclusion: Nudges from Courts Can Be More Powerful than Shoves
At first glance, rigorous rational basis scrutiny might look like too
little protection for groups from the courts too late, but that first
impression is wrong. This section has argued that rigorous rational basis
is indeed just the right tool for helping groups to integrate into and gain
acceptance from the larger democratic community.
It requires
majorities to treat minority groups as members of the democratic
community and to articulate reasons to justify treating those group
members differently. As Perry and Massachusetts show, rigorous
rational basis scrutiny permits courts to decide particular cases without
declaring broad principles that would commit them to declaring broader

487. Field Poll, supra note 417, at tbl.1.
488. Id.
489. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1089 (describing the rational-basis standard to be used as not
toothless with some footing in the realities of the legislation); see also Massachusetts, 682 F.3d
at 15 (opining that the scrutiny applied in analyzing DOMA’s constitutionality should be
something more than the ordinary deference afforded in rational basis scrutiny).
490. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 139 (1990) (“The first principle” of the American constitutional system “is selfgovernment, which means that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule, if they wish,
simply because they are majorities.”).
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491

rights in later cases. Two other cases, Baehr and In re Marriage Cases
show how strict scrutiny is a bigger, blunter tool that appears to be more
492
protective of groups’ rights. Strict scrutiny’s strength can undermine
its effectiveness because it can provoke backlash from majorities who
reject the implication that the protected group is for all intents and
purposes identical to the members of the majority. In contrast, rigorous
rational basis’s modesty is less likely than strict scrutiny to provoke
backlash from those opposed to a group’s agenda. Ultimately, it can
therefore promote greater progress in a group’s bid for tolerance and
acceptance as full-fledged members of the political community.
V. CONCLUSION.
In a wide range of cases the Supreme Court and lower courts have
applied a middle tier level of scrutiny—rigorous rational basis—to
protect some groups from attempts by majorities to restrict the liberties
of such groups based on dislike for or moral disapproval of such groups.
Despite its ubiquity, the Court has often denied that this mid-level
scrutiny exists and has never developed criteria for determining when
rigorous rational basis scrutiny will apply.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny should be applied to protect
“structural” groups from discrimination and describes criteria for
identifying when a structural group exists and should be entitled to
constitutional protection.
One frequent criticism of extending constitutional protection to
groups as opposed to prohibiting certain general classifications is that
group protection will promote group separatism as opposed to
assimilation into the larger American culture. Separatism in turn, goes
the argument, kindles identity politics with different groups competing
for their share of political goodies rather than being interested in
policies that promote the broader good. On this view, some groups’
entitlement to affirmative action encouraged people to identify more
strongly as members of those groups and to fight for stronger
affirmative action programs, despite the costs to other minority groups

491. See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8 (explaining that precedent does not “mandate[]
that the Constitution requires states to permit same-sex marriages”); Perry, 671 F.3d at 1082.
492. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008) (concluding that “statutes
imposing differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation” are constitutional suspect),
superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
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(such as Asian Americans) who did not benefit under affirmative-action
programs. Denying Asian Americans status as affirmative-action
beneficiaries, in turn, galvanized Asian Americans either to fight against
affirmative-action policies or for beneficiary status. Lost in the jostle
over the spoils for preferences was measured consideration of the
wisdom or utility of affirmative-action policies more generally in
promoting the broader societal good.
As the analysis in Part IV suggests, the Court’s use of rigorous
rational basis scrutiny to shield some groups from legislation based on
dislike or moral disapproval of a group is unlikely to spur divisive
identity politics, promote separatism, or weaken American national
493
identity. When groups insist on equal treatment under the law, they
are not petitioning for separation from American legal and community
institutions. They petition, instead, for inclusion in and equal treatment
494
by those institutions,
and that is what rigorous rational basis
guarantees to them. Indeed, rigorous rational basis scrutiny is likely to
produce quite the opposite effect. Rigorous rational basis scrutiny
protects and strengthens democracy and common national identity by
reducing individual group members’ need for a distinct and separate
495
group identity. The converse, in fact, is far more likely. Just as one

493. Iris Marion Young argued that
Paying specific attention to differentiated social groups in democratic discussion and
encouraging public expression of their situated knowledge thus often makes it more
possible than it would otherwise be for people to transform conflict and
disagreement into agreement. Speaking across differences in a context of public
accountability often reduces mutual ignorance about one another’s situations, or
misunderstanding of one another’s values, intentions, and perceptions, and gives
everyone the enlarged thought necessary to come to more reasonable and fairer
solutions to problems.
YOUNG, INCLUSION, supra note 238, at 118; see also id. at 82 (“I argue that political claims
asserted from the specificity of social group position, and which argue that the polity should
attend to these social differences, often serve as a resource for . . . democratic communication
that aims at justice.”); id. at 82, 225 (arguing that attending to group inequalities and
recognizing group identity facilitates the democratic engagement by transcending grudging
willingness to let others alone and creating an opportunity for others to listen to and engage
with each other).
494. See Eskridge, Channeling, supra note 269, at 486 (arguing that “[l]ike the due
process and speech cases, the equal protection cases were a tacit concession by potential
rebels that they wanted to remain part of the pluralist constitutional polity”).
495. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 97 (“Most often, when individual men and
women insist on ‘being themselves,’ they are in fact defending a self they share with others.”
(quoting Michael Walzer, Pluralism: A Political Perspective, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY
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has less need to march to protest mistreatment the law already forbids,
the less society insists that a particular fact about you defines you, the
less defining that fact will seem to be in your daily routine. Legal
recognition and protection of groups reduces the necessity of group
identity to its members and facilitates their integration in to the broader
496
community.
Rigorous rational basis scrutiny is an appropriate level of scrutiny to
promote a group’s inclusion as it is less likely to spark political backlash
against a group’s court victories than stricter constitutional scrutiny. In
short, it is a nudge, not a shove. Unlike strict scrutiny, it does not
declare as a matter of constitutional law that group membership is
irrelevant to government decision making. It does, however, require a
reason for limiting the liberties of some group besides the majority’s
dislike of the group or fears about the group. In the absence of such
reasons, rigorous rational basis scrutiny strikes down a particular
restriction. The ball is then back in the majority’s court to rethink their
reasons for that restriction to determine if there are any reasons besides
fear or dislike and reconsider their desire to discriminate against a
group. Ultimately, the nudge of rigorous rational basis scrutiny can be
just as if not more effective a tool for securing the equality of a group
because it forces a majority to grapple with the reasons why it wants to
treat some groups differently.

CULTURES 139, 146 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995)).
496. KARST, BELONGING, supra note 256, at 96 (“When the enforced separation of a . . .
minority ends, and its members come to participate in the activities and institutions of the
wider society, their participation itself promotes assimilation.”).

